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  INTRODUCTION   
We live in a coordination economy. As one surveys the myr-
iad challenges of modern social and economic life, an ever-
increasing proportion is defined not by the need to reconcile 
competing interests, but by the challenge of getting everyone on 
the same page. Conflict is not absent in these settings. It is not, 
however, the determinative factor in shaping our behaviors and 
resulting interactions. That essential ingredient, instead, is 
coordination. 
No less an episode than the recent financial crisis helps to 
highlight as much. For all the ink spilt over Bernie Madoff ’s 
mind-boggling Ponzi scheme, the extreme risk-taking behavior 
of AIG’s Financial Products unit, and the massive executive 
bonuses awarded before, during, and after the market’s col-
lapse, none of these indisputably bad acts goes to the heart of 
the financial crisis. What made the crisis a crisis, rather, was a 
failure of coordination. Having previously gotten too far ahead 
of the market, the expectations of banks and other sources of 
capital abruptly fell behind it. A paralyzing credit crunch—a 
classic coordination failure—followed, with all the conse-
quences we have since lived through.1 
Consider the equally familiar example of the Internet. 
Surely few technologies have more dramatically altered social 
and economic life in recent decades than the World Wide Web.2 
Like the financial markets, the Internet turns out to be a mas-
sive exercise in coordination. The Internet backbone, the com-
mon technical standards on which it relies, and even the core 
business models emerging out of it, rely on the coordination of 
 
 1. See generally Chrystia Freeland, The Credit Crunch According to So-
ros—Part I, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 
aaadcffe-ef37-11dd-bbb5-0000778fd2ac.html (discussing the events leading up 
to the current financial crisis and the impact of the crisis). 
 2. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan, The Internet Economy, FOREIGN POL’Y, 
Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 16 (suggesting that the Internet may save Americans $200 
billion annually). 
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hundreds, thousands, and millions of users, variously acting as 
both producers and consumers.3 
The list goes on, from the Obama Administration’s aspira-
tions to modernize the electricity grid and lay the foundation 
for a high-speed rail system, to the encouragement of scientific 
innovation, to changing forms of musical creativity, to the rise 
of social networks, in each of these cases, the critical task is not 
overcoming conflicting interests—the conventional aim in our 
efforts to maximize social and economic welfare—but coordinat-
ing the choices of large numbers of individuals and institutions. 
Much of the vaunted “New Economy” turns out to be a coordi-
nation economy.4 
Maintaining financial stability, developing the Internet, 
building telecommunications, electricity, and transportation 
networks, and increasing innovation, however, have proven to 
be significant challenges for policymakers. Even as the reach of 
the Internet has extended dramatically, questions about the 
appropriate scope and nature of its regulation have largely 
paralyzed public efforts to foster its growth and development.5 
As the pace of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry and 
other sectors has fallen off, we have likewise struggled with 
how best to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”6 
Policymakers have also sat back as the U.S. electricity grid has 
fallen out-of-date,7 and the country has fallen well behind its 
 
 3. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE 
IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY 132–37 (2008) (describing the use of consumer data 
by Amazon.com, Google, and Netflix to generate incrementally improved 
search results and recommendations). 
 4. Cf. Steve Lohr, Computer Age Gains Respect of Economists, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 14, 1999, at A1, available at 1999 WLNR 3005400 (highlighting 
the role of “electronic links with customers and suppliers” in speeding business 
expansion). 
 5. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Optimizing Regulation of Elec-
tronic Commerce, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1497, 1503 (2004) (proposing a mixed pub-
lic-private regulatory regime to account for the unique problems posed by the 
Internet); Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 529, 536–37 (2009) (suggesting a “co-regulation” model for the Internet); 
Timothy S. Wu, Cyberspace Sovereignty?—The Internet and the International 
System, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 647, 649–56 (1997) (discussing and responding 
to scholars who question the ability to regulate the Internet). 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Jonathan Huebner, A Possible 
Declining Trend for Worldwide Innovation, 72 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. 
CHANGE 980, 985 (2005) (noting a decline in the rate of new inventions). 
 7. Drew Thornley, Op-Ed., America Needs to Charge Feds with Improving 
Electrical Grid, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 21, 2010, http://www.sfexaminer.com/ 
opinions/columns/oped_contributors/america-needs-to-charge-feds-with-improving 
-electrical-grid-103503154.html. 
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peers in the construction of high-speed rail lines.8 Perhaps most 
striking was the halting—even fumbling—response to the fi-
nancial crisis at its earliest stages.9  
At first glance, our ambivalence, inertia, and confusion in 
the regulation of these varied arenas might seem unrelated. At 
least in part, however, the challenge in each area can be traced 
to a failure to engage with the role of regulation in facilitating 
coordination. This Article seeks to address that gap. 
Coordination is commonly understood as the function of 
the market. The “invisible hand”—or less metaphorically, the 
determination of equilibrium price by the aggregation of supply 
and demand—is the dominant mechanism of coordination in a 
market economy.10 When coordination occurs at one point ver-
sus another, or even fails to occur at all, we have consequently 
not been conditioned to see the possibility of a coordination 
failure. Rather, we see the market as having spoken.11 
Optimal coordination will not always emerge, however, as 
if led “by an invisible hand.”12 Even in settings where coordina-
tion is essential, it may fail to materialize, may emerge in a 
form that could have been improved upon, or may not be ame-
nable to displacement despite the world changing around it.13 
There consequently may be a role for regulation in encourag-
ing, fostering, and facilitating efficient coordination in the fi-
nancial markets, on the Internet, and in technological innova-
tion.14 
Where the impetus for regulation lies in the demands of 
coordination—as distinct from more familiar externalities and 
 
 8. See Keith Bradsher, A High-Speed Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 3067192. 
 9. See Alan S. Blinder, Six Blunders En Route to a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 25, 2009, at BU7, available at 2009 WLNR 1435200. 
 10. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, BOOKS IV–V 1–12, 32 (An-
drew Skinner ed., Penguin Books 1999) (1776). 
 11. In his Pulitzer Prize-winning account of what might be cast as a coor-
dination function for managerial administration in modern business, historian 
Alfred Chandler highlighted just the type of counterpoint with the invisible 
hand that I aim to suggest in this Article. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE 
VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 1 (1977). 
 12. SMITH, supra note 10, at 32. 
 13. See infra Parts II.C, and III.B.1. 
 14. See ROBERT W. CRANDALL, BROOKINGS INST., EXTENDING DEREG-
ULATION: MAKE THE U.S. ECONOMY MORE EFFICIENT (2007), available at http:// 
www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Projects/Opportunity08/PB_Deregulation_ 
Crandall.pdf (prepared for the Brookings Institute’s “Opportunity 08” project). 
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collective action problems15—the form of any such intervention 
will likewise vary. One can expect such interventions to em-
phasize the shaping of expectations rather than the alteration 
of incentives, to be intertwined with questions of information 
and knowledge, and to focus on the dynamics of groups. Coor-
dination-driven regulation in the financial markets, the Inter-
net, or standard setting thus emerges as a kind of “New Regu-
lation.”16 
In Part I, I posit the rise of a coordination economy. To be-
gin, I draw attention to areas of the social and economic order 
in which coordination is critical. I then highlight recent schol-
arship by Yochai Benkler, Michael Heller, Larry Lessig, and 
others that, while they do not explicitly frame it as such, focus-
es on just the dynamic of coordination I emphasize herein.17 
Part II turns to a strand of game theory largely overlooked by 
regulation theorists to offer a theory of the role of regulation in 
coordination settings. While legal scholars have exhibited a 
near obsession with the Prisoner’s Dilemma,18 other games 
turn out to be no less useful in the analysis of law. In particu-
lar, coordination games offer valuable insight into the patterns 
of interaction studied in this Article and highlight distinct ways 
in which coordination may require regulatory intervention, 
 
 15. Cf. STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15–35 (1982) 
(discussing “traditional” reasons for regulation such as control of monopolies, 
limits on rent seeking, and “compensating for externalities”); Jon D. Hanson & 
Kyle D. Logue, The Cost of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incen-
tive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1253 (1998) (summarizing one ar-
gument for requiring smokers to internalize the social costs of smoking). 
 16. See infra Part III. I do not mean to suggest that coordination has dis-
placed the worries behind our regulatory interventions in areas including en-
vironmental law, workplace safety, and securities trading. The conflicting in-
centives that motivate regulation in these spheres are no less important today 
than a century ago. The dynamics at work in the financial markets, the Inter-
net, the encouragement of innovation, and elsewhere simply make coordina-
tion a crucial concern as well. I likewise appreciate the mix of coordination 
and conflict that will often be present. The excess risk taking that helped to 
produce the recent financial crisis, for example, is properly understood as 
grounded in conflicting interests and attendant negative externalities, not-
withstanding the fact that the crisis it generated was defined by a failure of 
coordination. See infra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 60–81 and accompanying text. 
 18. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coor-
dination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 214 (2009). For a 
concise description of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, see WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, 
PRISONER’S DILEMMA 103–05 (1992). 
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beyond the market failures regulation theory has commonly 
emphasized.19 
If coordination is increasingly central to the social and eco-
nomic order, and will sometimes favor a role for regulation, 
what form can we expect such regulation to take? While a full 
account of the latter must depend on its analysis in individual 
policy settings,20 Part III explores the broad outlines of a regu-
latory regime attuned to coordination. I consider, in turn, the 
implications of three shifts in emphasis as we move away from 
settings characterized by coordination games rather than Pris-
oner’s Dilemma dynamics. First, the focus moves from relevant 
actors’ incentives to their expectations. Second, players’ choice 
of behavior is characterized by multiple equilibria rather than 
dominant strategies. Finally, a heightened emphasis on groups 
supplements our conventional focus on individuals. Ultimately, 
these shifts point to the prospect of a regulatory regime that is 
more selective in its use of coercion, is more oriented to infor-
mation production and the encouragement of innovation, and is 
more willing to embrace broader forms of both private regula-
tion and potentially reviewable state action. 
I should note an important caveat regarding the normative 
implications of the analysis herein. My argument is that we 
need to recognize coordination as an increasingly important 
impetus for regulatory action. But one should not take this as 
an assertion of the presumptive efficiency of such intervention. 
State actors may not be especially good, for example, at setting 
technological standards. Likewise, they may be prone to cap-
ture, and may encourage lock-in of an early mover’s choice of 
standards, even absent any such bias.21 This is all the more 
reason for us to be sensitive to the dynamics of coordination in 
the modern social and economic order and to its implications 
for the regulatory state. A far broader range of state action 
might thus be judged to deserve review under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act once we recognize the coordinative role of 
regulation.22 
 
 19. For a description of coordination games and their differences from 
Prisoner’s Dilemma games, see McAdams, supra note 18, at 218–24. 
 20. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Dis-
course, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1425–26 
(1996) (emphasizing the need for “microanalysis of institutions” in seeking to 
properly understand social and economic phenomena of interest to legal schol-
ars). 
 21. See infra III.B.1. 
 22. See infra note 191 and accompanying text. A proper appreciation of 
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More generally, by attending to the coordination functions 
of regulation, some of the confusion and paralysis that have 
characterized our regulatory approach to the Internet, to high-
tech innovation, and to the financial markets may be alle-
viated. Our inability to regulate effectively in these areas might 
thus be traced to our misconceptions of the actual function, and 
consequently the appropriate form, of regulation in these and 
other coordination spheres. 
Yet more broadly, an appreciation of the coordination func-
tions of regulation may speak to some of the uncertainty in our 
positive accounts of the regulatory state: Is it expanding or 
shrinking? Is it growing stronger or weaker? Is the public sec-
tor becoming more private or the private sector more public? It 
may also shed light on the normative and prescriptive ques-
tions that ensue: When is regulatory intervention appropriate? 
What form should it take? And, most abstractly, what should 
the modern administrative state look like? 
To address these questions, we must acknowledge the 
changing demands on our regulatory apparatus. In important 
spheres, the modern administrative state may increasingly be a 
coordination state. This is not a story of deregulation or small 
government, nor is it one of reregulation or big government. 
Rather, the question to which it speaks “is not whether our 
Government is too big or small, but whether it works.”23 
I.  THE COORDINATION ECONOMY   
Viewed through the prism of law, we seem to live in a 
world defined by conflict. It is in the regulation of conflicts con-
cerning preferences, interests, and resulting incentives that 
law is commonly seen to serve its role. Across myriad aspects of 
our social and economic life, however, the critical challenge is 
not negotiating conflicting interests, but getting everyone on 
 
the coordination functions of regulation likewise counsels reconsideration of 
the “market participant” exemption in our Dormant Commerce Clause juris-
prudence. See generally Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant 
Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 398–400 
(1989); infra notes 260–61 and accompanying text. 
 23. ADMINISTRATION OF BARACK H. OBAMA, 2009 INAUGURAL ADDRESS 
(Jan. 20, 2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD 
200900001.pdf. As a popular newsmagazine framed recent debates over regu-
latory reform: “All of this is unfolding in an economy that can no longer be un-
derstood, even in passing, as the Great Society vs. the Gipper.” John Meacham 
& Evan Thomas, We Are All Socialists Now, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 2009, at 23, 
available at 2009 WLNR 2549898. 
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the same page. In these settings, the operative task is to coor-
dinate individuals’ expectations of one another by way of know-
ledge, information, and, perhaps, even regulation. 
In recent years, such coordination has become an increas-
ingly critical aspect of life in modern industrialized nations. 
Consider the most consequential social and economic event in 
recent memory: the financial crisis of the last several years. 
Much of our attention to the crisis has focused on grotesque in-
cidents of fraud perpetrated by the Bernie Madoffs and Allan 
Stanfords of the financial industry, on dramatic risk taking by 
financial institutions such as AIG’s Financial Products unit, 
and on badly designed and overly generous executive bonuses.24 
The heart of the financial crisis, however, was a failure of coor-
dination. 
Operation of the modern credit markets depends on collec-
tive dynamics of lending and investment.25 Consider the in-
vestment that stands behind commercial lending today—banks’ 
securitization of relevant debts and sale of the resulting securi-
ties to hedge fund and private equity investors.26 The abrupt 
shutdown of this market triggered the recent credit crunch. 
 
 24. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews & Vikas Bajaj, Amid Fury, U.S. Is Set to 
Curb Executives’ Pay After Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at A1, available 
at 2009 WLNR 2059127 (discussing the Obama Administration’s response to 
excessive executive pay); Beth Healy, Madoff Takes Step Toward Guilty Plea, 
BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2009, at 5, available at 2009 WLNR 4389072. This is not 
to suggest that dynamics of defection are irrelevant to an understanding of fi-
nancial crises. As noted above, the payment of massive bonuses, fraudulent 
behavior, and high-risk lending are all incidents of defection from socially op-
timal equilibria. Particularly the last of these—risky lending and investment 
practices by financial sector firms—can be understood to have been an impor-
tant impetus behind the recent financial crisis. More broadly, in fact, patterns 
of defection may often be ex ante factors in prompting financial crises. For the 
reasons outlined above, however, the ex post alleviation of such crises turns on 
a dynamic of coordination. 
 25. See Bianna Golodryga, Financial Crisis, Bailout Has Ripples Past 
Wall Street, ABCNEWS.COM, Sept. 28, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story? 
id=5902773 (quoting Bush Administration spokesperson Dana Perino: “If no 
one in the financial community trusts each other to lend money, then we’re 
going to have a complete and total financial collapse”); see also Bob Davis & 
Carrick Mollencamp, Financial Protectionism is Latest Threat to Global Re-
covery, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2009, at A2 (noting the retreat of various national 
banking communities into defensive stances in the aftermath of the 2008 finan-
cial crisis). 
 26. See Vikas Bajaj, Lending Locked, U.S. Tries a Trillion-Dollar Key, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 3328102 (“Most 
banks no longer hold the loans they make . . . . Instead, the loans are bundled 
into securities that are sold to investors, a process known as securitization.”). 
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Deprived of the ability to move existing loans off their balance 
sheets, banks ceased to issue new ones.27 
Why was there such an abrupt collapse in the market for 
bank debt? The willingness of any given hedge fund or private 
equity firm to invest, it turns out, depends on the willingness of 
others to invest as well. Unprofitable as withholding credit and 
investments are for the banking industry and the investors 
that stand behind it, it is preferable to lending and investing 
alone.28 When it comes to the credit markets, coordinated en-
try, coordinated participation, and coordinated exit are conse-
quently the norm.29 
To appreciate this, consider the dynamic at work in a bank 
run. In the latter, depositors’ simultaneous attempts to with-
draw funds bankrupts a bank, given its retention of only a lim-
ited proportion of its liabilities in reserve.30 As modeled by Di-
amond and Dybvig, the dispositive characteristic of a bank run 
is the presence of multiple equilibria.31 In the superior equili-
brium, depositors maintain their deposits with the bank as 
they expect others to as well, and they are thereby assured of 
their ability to withdraw their funds on whatever future date 
they need them. This allows others to withdraw at earlier 
dates, thereby generating an efficient distribution of risk 
among all depositors.32 In the inferior equilibrium, by contrast, 
confidence has been undermined. Each depositor expects others 
to withdraw and therefore seeks withdrawal of her own depo-
sits as well. The result is a dynamic of coordination. Where de-
 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Golodryga, supra note 25. 
 29. Scholars have explored this dynamic of interlinkage and resulting in-
terdependency in the financial markets as a form of “systemic risk.” See Ste-
ven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198–201 (2008). 
 30. This is the essential structure of bank finance in a system of fractional 
reserve banking. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of 
Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 694–96 
(1988); Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification 
of the Insurance Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 639, 647 n.22 (1993); Albert J. 
Boro, Jr., Comment, Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating Speculative 
Behavior, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 431, 434–35 (1986). 
 31. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit In-
surance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 402 (1983) (“This vulnerability 
occurs because there are multiple equilibria with differing levels of confi-
dence.”). Confirming the mistaken emphasis on the Prisoner’s Dilemma versus 
coordination games suggested infra Part II, bank runs have often been mis-
characterized as Prisoner’s Dilemma games by legal scholars. See e.g., McAd-
ams, supra note 18, at 216–17. 
 32. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 31, at 403. 
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positors coordinate around a “maintain deposit” equilibrium, 
returns are optimized; when they coordinate around a “with-
draw deposit” equilibrium, we have a financial crisis.33 
The recent crisis saw important examples of such bank 
runs, including the cases of Bear Stearns and Northern Rock.34 
The critical dynamic in the crisis was not one of bank runs, 
however, but rather a credit crunch, which abruptly curtailed 
both individual and institutional access to capital.35 At its 
heart, however, the pattern was the same. Over the course of 
2008 and 2009, lenders resisted lending and investors resisted 
investing on the expectation that others would not be lending 
or investing either. 
A credit crunch thus turns out to be a multiple equilibrium 
or coordination dynamic akin to that of a bank run.36 As in the 
latter, banks can be expected to coordinate around either a 
strategy of lending funds or of withholding them.37 Likewise, 
depending on relevant expectations, hedge funds and private 
equity investors will coordinate around a policy of investment 
or noninvestment (or even divestment).38 A credit crunch and 
 
 33. See id. at 403–04 (noting the genesis of bank runs is “a shift in expec-
tations”). 
 34. See Jane Kamensky, Boom and Bust: It’s the American Way, L.A. 
TIMES, July 20, 2008, at 1, available at 2008 WLNR 13528841 (noting the cor-
rosive effects of an expanding “circle of mistrust” in recent bank failures); Rob-
in Sidel, The Week that Shook Wall Street: Inside the Bailout of Bear Stearns, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A1 (highlighting how the spread of “negative 
rumors” caused investors to withdraw funds from Bear Stearns and erode its 
otherwise strong capital reserve). 
 35. See Daniel Indiviglio, Another Shot at the Credit Crunch, 
FORBES.COM, Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/03/talf-fed-lending 
-business-washington_talf_print.html (noting the creation of a government 
program to relieve the credit crunch). 
 36. See Russell Cooper & Andrew John, Coordinating Coordination Fail-
ures in Keynesian Models, 103 Q.J. ECON. 441, 447 (1988) (“[H]ighlight[ing] 
the connection between strategic complementarity and multiplicity of equili-
bria.”); Paul R. Masson, Multiple Equilibria, Contagion, and the Emerging 
Market Crises 5–11 (Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper WP/99/164, 
1999) (discussing three distinct accounts of multiple equilibria in financial 
markets); see also id. at 3 (“[M]odels with multiple equilibria . . . square better 
with the stylized facts of global financial markets.”). The same might be said of 
the dynamics at work among creditors in the face of a potential bankruptcy. 
See McAdams, supra note 18, at 218 n.32. 
 37. See Masson, supra note 36, at 6 (“[I]f each bank believes that all other 
banks will stop lending, all banks will stop lending.” (quoting Jeffrey Sachs, 
Theoretical Issues in International Borrowing 32 (Princeton Studies in Int’l 
Fin. Working Paper No. 54, 1984))). 
 38. Some have characterized financial crises as arising out of “strategic 
complementarities”—a dynamic of positive feedback, in which payoffs arise 
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other forms of financial crises thus might be seen as simply the 
supply-side corollary of the demand-side coordination failure 
we see in a bank run.39 Maintaining the stability of the mar-
kets and avoiding financial crises consequently emerge as com-
plex exercises in coordination.40 
 
from choices that match those of other market participants. See Jeremy I. Bu-
low et al., Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, 93 
J. POL. ECON. 488, 491–97 (1985); Cooper & John, supra note 36, at 447. The 
same holds true for accounts of the financial markets. Compare Robert B. Ah-
dieh, Law’s Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 215, 223–25 (2004) (discussing how financial markets are shaped by 
“network externalities”), and Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Exter-
nalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985) 
(same), with JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT 
INTEREST AND MONEY 156 (1936) (comparing markets to a type of beauty con-
test where each observer’s assessment is defined by that of her counterparts). 
Two distinct, but related, effects of financial crises are grounded in non-
rational “herd” behavior, by which markets move up and down dramatically 
based on small movements irrationally mimicked by others. See Christopher 
Avery & Peter Zemsky, Multidimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in 
Financial Markets, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 724, 724 (1998); V.V. Chari & Patrick J. 
Kehoe, Financial Crises as Herds: Overturning the Critiques, 119 J. ECON. 
THEORY 128, 129–30 (2004); cf. Paul Krugman, A Model of Balance-of-Payment 
Crises, 11 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 311, 319 (1979) (noting that balance-
of-payments crises tend to occur when “speculators” as a group act in response to 
a belief that the government is about to abandon its fixed exchange rate). 
Whether it is the rational dynamic of strategic complementarity or irrational 
patterns of herd behavior, both accounts rest on a dynamic in which market 
returns depend on the coordination of investors around one equilibrium or 
another. 
 39. Maurice Obstfeld, by way of example, has modeled currency crises as 
exhibiting bank-run-style multiple equilibria, in which speculators do or do 
not attack a currency, depending on their expectations of other speculators’ 
likely behavior. See Maurice Obstfeld, Models of Currency Crises with Self-
Fulfilling Features, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 1037, 1039 (1996). 
 40. Other accounts of coordination in the financial markets might also be 
offered. Hayek’s theory of the function of price is a story of economic coordina-
tion. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 227–30 (1960) 
(discussing how price is dependent upon several factors working together). The 
Austrian school’s account of money is likewise an account of coordination at its 
foundation. See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE LOGIC OF ACTION I: METHOD, 
MONEY, AND THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL 211–12 (1997). The effective valuation of 
money thus necessitates some dynamic of coordination. More concrete dynam-
ics of coordination might be seen in the creation and the evolution of financial 
market infrastructure. See Ahdieh, supra note 38, at 223–29. Recent debates 
over the wave of linkages among exchanges and securities trading systems, as 
well as some incidents of full-fledged merger, can be understood in this light. 
See, e.g., Ioannis Kokkoris & Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Lessons from the Re-
cent Stock Exchange Merger Activity, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 837, 855 
(2008) (discussing the issues of competition-concern and coordination-related 
matters). The same is true of discussions over the growing practice of the dual-
listing of stocks on multiple exchanges. See Dana T. Ackerley II & Eric J. Pan, 
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The financial markets, meanwhile, are far from unique in 
the centrality of coordination to their operation. To the con-
trary, the strongest evidence of the growing importance of coor-
dination in modern social and economic life may be in other 
areas. Consider the ever-increasing influence of the Internet. 
The Internet, like the financial markets, is a massive exer-
cise in coordination. Its operation—with its dependence on 
common standards for file sharing, interoperable search tools, 
and an effective network for interconnection—involves coordi-
nation at every level.41 Faced with an array of alternative file 
transfer protocols, for example, the emergence of the Internet 
required regulators to embrace a common standard.42 Thus, we 
see an important role for the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) in coordinating users around that and other standards. 
No less significant has been the ongoing role of the IETF in fa-
cilitating the evolution of Internet protocols and standards.43 
Coordination likewise undergirds, if in distinct ways, the 
Internet backbone: the über-network of trunk lines by which 
 
Dual-Listing Securities in Europe and the United States, in THE COMPLETE 
GUIDE TO LISTING ON THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE 7 (2002) (“The coordina-
tion between the U.S. and the non-U.S. tranches of the offering must be care-
fully worked out . . . .”). Even the heated response to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission’s moves toward harmonization of disclosure standards 
might be seen to implicate the coordination dynamic at work in the securities 
market structure. See Patrick E. Hopkins et al., Response to the SEC Release: 
Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in 
Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards Without Recon-
ciliation to U.S. GAAP File No. S7-13-07, 22 ACCT. HORIZONS 223, 223–33 
(2008) (critiquing the SEC’s proposal to accept financial statements from for-
eign private issuers prepared in accordance with International Financial Re-
porting Standards (IFRS), without reconciling such statements with U.S. 
GAAP). 
 41. See generally Sharon Eisner Gillett & Mitchell Kapor, The Self-
Governing Internet: Coordination by Design, in COORDINATION OF THE 
INTERNET 3 (Brian Kahin & James Keller eds., 1997), available at http://ccs 
.mit.edu/papers/CCSWP197/CCSWP197.html. 
 42. See id. at 11 (stating that protocol standards must be agreed upon if 
they are to be operable). 
 43. See id. at 12–13 (describing IETF’s role in developing Internet proto-
cols and standardizing existing practices, particularly as to interoperability 
questions). The IETF’s ongoing coordinative role might be usefully contrasted 
with the episodic pattern of regulatory coordination commonly at work in the 
financial markets. In the latter case, a coordination role for regulation be-
comes especially critical when the market shifts to the suboptimal equilibrium 
of diminished lending and investment. See supra notes 32–37 and accompany-
ing text. In many coordination settings, however, from the Internet to the en-
couragement of innovation, the coordination role of regulation is more likely to 
be ongoing. 
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local access networks are connected with one another.44 In re-
cent years, the construction, expansion, and control of the 
backbone has provoked heated debates, behind which stand 
questions of coordination.45 Most fundamentally, the very na-
ture of the Internet is a dynamic of coordination. It relies on a 
noncentralized system of data processing that occurs at net-
work endpoints rather than within the network itself.46 Such a 
system is inherently one of coordination.47 
The coordination dynamic underlying the Internet suggests 
yet other dimensions of our social and economic life that are 
grounded in coordination. It highlights, for example, the in-
creasing importance of standard-setting issues in modern in-
dustrialized nations.48 In many of the most important areas of 
technological innovation today, interoperability is the key char-
acteristic of relevant technologies.49 The benefits of high-
definition television (HDTV), for example, depend on the com-
patibility of HDTV television units, data distribution networks, 
and relevant programming.50 Developments in wireless com-
munications are to similar effect.51 The importance of stand-
ardized technologies can also be seen in the increasing inci-
 
 44. See Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds 
Itself Together, and the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 
346 n.11 (2008) (“Backbones are the Internet’s long-distance links between lo-
cal access networks.”). 
 45. See generally id. (discussing the centralization/decentralization debate 
surrounding the Internet backbone). Operation of the Internet thus depends 
on coordination across an array of data networks and core routers, and hence 
among the various governmental, commercial, and academic institutions that 
own or control those systems. See Judith A. Endejan, Cable’s “Other Hat”—
Providing Telecommunications Services, in CABLE TELEVISION LAW 1999, at 
291, 339–47 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course 
Handbook Ser. No. G0-0003A, 1999). 
 46. See Werbach, supra note 44, at 399–400. 
 47. See id. at 345–46. 
 48. The growing influence of the International Organization for Standard-
ization (ISO) helps to highlight as much. See INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARD-
IZATION, ISO IN BRIEF 2–3 (2008), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/ 
isoinbrief_2008.pdf. 
 49. See Saul Hansell, Connecting Gadgets Is Theme at Annual Show, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at B7, available at 2009 WLNR 349655. 
 50. See Joel Johnson, HDTV Guidebook, POPULAR MECHANICS, Jan. 2006, 
at 32, 32–34. 
 51. Cf. T.G. Zimmerman, Wireless Networked Digital Devices: A New Par-
adigm for Computing and Communication, 38 IBM SYSTEMS J. 566, 571–73 
(1999), available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber= 
5387057&tag=1 (discussing the ability of wireless technologies to share informa-
tion). 
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dence of standards conflicts in recent years, including the ex-
tended battle between Blu-ray and HD DVD standards,52 the 
International Organization for Standardization’s controversial 
adoption of Microsoft’s Open Office XML standard,53 and the 
geopolitical tensions surrounding China’s development of its 
own wireless services standard.54 Standard setting is also criti-
cal outside the technological sphere, playing a role in disclosure 
standards in various settings (including the financial mar-
kets),55 environmental protection standards,56 and data collec-
tion and compilation initiatives in any number of areas.57 In 
these and other standard-setting pursuits, the critical issue is 
again effective coordination. The very point of a standard is to 
serve as a means of coordination—as a way to get everyone on 
the same page. 
The network dimensions of the Internet, meanwhile, high-
light the growing universe of network industries as settings in 
which coordination is essential. Most tangibly, one might cite 
recent discussions of high-speed rail networks and a modern-
ized power transmission grid,58 particularly following the Feb-
ruary 2009 stimulus bill’s provision of federal seed money for 
 
 52. See Laura Evans, Monitoring Technology in the American Workplace: 
Would Adopting English Privacy Standards Better Balance Employee Privacy 
and Productivity?, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1115, 1148 n.242 (2007) (noting the ex-
tended standards battle between Blu-ray and HD DVD standards).  
 53. See Peter Sayer, ISO Confirms Approval of OOXML, Gives Two Months 
to Appeal, COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 2, 2008), http://www.computerworld.com/ 
s/article/print/9074358/ISO_confirms_approval_of_OOXML_gives_two_months_ 
to_appeal?taxonomyName=Security&taxonomyId=1. 
 54. See Christopher S. Gibson, Globalization and the Technology Stand-
ards Game: Balancing Concerns of Protectionism and Intellectual Property in 
International Standards, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1403, 1404–05 (2007). 
 55. See Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance 
Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1055, 1097 (2004). 
 56. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
1278, 1290–93 (1993). 
 57. Data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau on public school finances is 
suggestive. See Preston C. Green, III et al., Achieving Racial Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity Through School Finance Litigation, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
283, 302 n.130 (2008).  
 58. See Matthew L. Wald, Wind Energy Bumps into Power Grid’s Limits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNA 16147962; Matthew 
Daly, Stimulus Bill Would Boost NW Grid, Wind Energy, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Feb. 1, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008695421_ 
apstimulusbpa.html. 
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these projects.59 In the construction of these network struc-
tures, as in the less bricks-and-mortar development of the In-
ternet backbone and the growing linkages among securities 
trading systems, coordination constitutes the relevant goal. 
Coordination can likewise be seen in the development and evo-
lution of the very different network forms exemplified by Face-
book, Twitter, and other online social networks.60 
Finally, the centrality of innovation to the Internet helps to 
suggest the importance of coordination for innovation general-
ly. In part, this can be traced to present-day structures of inno-
vation finance.61 More significantly, it rests on the explosion of 
patenting in recent decades and the resulting need for innova-
tors to coordinate their efforts with a wide and diverse array of 
patent holders.62 Much of the slowing pace of innovation in re-
cent years can consequently be traced to failures of coordina-
tion. 
Coordination therefore stands at the center of a great deal 
of what we think about, and worry about, in the modern social 
and economic order. In the construction of physical networks, 
such as the electrical grid, this is readily apparent. In the pre-
vention and alleviation of financial crises and the facilitation of 
efficient levels of technological innovation, by contrast, it lies 
beneath the surface. Coordination plays a narrow and defined 
role in some settings, but is pervasive in others. Whatever its 
visibility or scope in any given setting, it is clear that the place 
of coordination in the social and economic order warrants our 
attention. 
 
 59. See Daly, supra note 58; David M. Herszenhorn, Even After the Deal, 
Tinkering Goes On, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A20, available at 2009 
WLNR 2851263. 
 60. See Nicole B. Ellison et al., Social Network Sites and Society: Current 
Trends and Future Possibilities, INTERACTIONS, Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 6, 6. 
 61. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States 
and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance De-
bate, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 865, 865–67 (1997). 
 62. See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH 
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 6 (2008) 
(arguing that patent laws for medical research reduce collaboration and block 
the development of potentially helpful drugs and yet no one complains); Mi-
chael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–701 (1998); Rob-
ert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents: Increasing Innovation and Reduc-
ing Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of Software Patent Law, 25 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 191, 213 (2008) (describing “patent 
thickets” in computer software development); infra notes 74–75 and accompa-
nying text. 
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Why, then, has coordination not been a subject of close 
study by legal scholars? At least in part, it is because our cur-
rent frame of mind has rendered coordination invisible to us.63 
Coordination has largely been seen as the responsibility of the 
market.64 Where coordination materializes in one form versus 
another, or fails to emerge at all, we see no coordination failure. 
Rather, as determined pupils of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Na-
tions,65 we instead see an invisible hand having dictated that a 
particular coordination point—or no coordination at all—was 
the optimal result. When it comes to coordination, there has 
consequently been little to discuss. 
Of late, however, a number of scholars have begun to en-
gage the dynamics of coordination.66 For the most part, they 
have not explicitly acknowledged, or perhaps even appreciated, 
as much. Yet their work has highlighted the centrality of visi-
ble, active, and conscious coordination in modern social and 
economic life.67 Although writing on divergent subjects, and of-
fering distinct conclusions, all can be seen to be engaged with 
stories of coordination and the myriad ways in which it changes 
things.68 
Consider The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Owner-
ship Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives, in 
which Michael Heller explores the potential for a “tragedy of 
the anticommons” in property law.69 As framed by Heller, the 
dynamic is the inverse of the familiar tragedy of the commons, 
in which a lack of private property rights fosters over-
consumption.70 In the tragedy of the anticommons, we see just 
the opposite: a dynamic in which excess property rights foster 
underuse of relevant resources.71 Because of ambiguity in iden-
 
 63. Cf. HELLER, supra note 62, at 23 (explaining the difficulty in fixing prob-
lems without first creating a consensus on certain aspects of the problems). 
 64. More precisely, it is the price function that is ordinarily understood as 
the mechanism of efficient coordination in a market economy. See GEORGE J. 
STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 85 (3d ed. 1966). 
 65. SMITH, supra note 10. 
 66. See, e.g., HELLER, supra note 62, at 6. 
 67. See id. 
 68. The authors thus variously suggest a need to reassess the place of the 
market incentives and the role of the individual, to reconsider the potential 
impact of spontaneous action and the nature of production, and to recognize 
the increasing role of knowledge and information in the generation of wealth. 
See infra notes 60–80 and accompanying text. 
 69. HELLER, supra note 62, at 18. 
 70. See id. at 18–19. 
 71. See id. 
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tifying pertinent ownership rights, transaction costs in secur-
ing the authorization of all relevant rights holders, and other 
difficulties attendant to a multiplicity of ownership, resources 
end up sitting idle.72 
Such excess ownership and resulting tragedies of the anti-
commons, Heller suggests, are common in modern industrial 
economies.73 Perhaps most dramatically, he highlights the rela-
tively slow pace of innovation in pharmaceutical products—a 
striking state of affairs, given the great expectations for the 
biotech revolution in its early days.74 This result proves unsur-
prising, though, when we recall the dispersion of patent rights 
among a broad and sometimes difficult to identify class of 
rights holders. Caught between the high costs of trying to coor-
dinate this group and the risk of costly litigation should the 
group inadvertently exclude any member, potential innovators 
instead abandon their efforts.75 
This pattern in pharmaceutical innovation is far from 
unique. Heller likewise highlights other settings in which dis-
persed ownership has generated underuse of a valuable re-
source.76 Air travel delays would be readily alleviated, he sug-
gests, were we to construct a few additional runways across the 
United States.77 Given the fragmented ownership of relevant 
land and the absence of any ready mechanism for its assembly, 
however, those runways remain unbuilt. Similarly, fragmented 
licensing of the telecommunications spectrum by the Federal 
Communications Commission has left wide swaths of the spec-
trum unused, which has caused the United States to lag well 
behind Japan and South Korea in wireless broadband penetra-
tion.78 Efficient power transmission and potential new forms of 
artistic creativity, Heller suggests, are yet further victims of 
the tragedy of the anticommons.79  
The fatal flaw in these settings is not suboptimal action by 
individual owners. Rather, it is the inaction by owners collec-
tively that has resulted in the market failure. The operative 
challenge is to coordinate property-rights holders around an ef-
 
 72. See id.  
 73. See id. at 19–20. 
 74. See id. at 49–50. 
 75. See id. at 49–52. 
 76. See id. at 19–20. 
 77. See id. at 8–9. 
 78. See id. at 81. 
 79. See id. at 13–16, 19–20. 
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ficient equilibrium of consumption and use. As in the financial 
markets and the Internet, the essential need in pharmaceutical 
innovation, airport construction, and telecommunications is to 
capitalize on an underutilized resource.80 This requires effec-
tive coordination of dispersed owners, whether amidst a dense 
thicket of patents, among divided property interests, or across a 
fragmented broadcast spectrum.81 Where this need for coordi-
nation is unmet, productive assets will go to waste.82 Further 
aggravating the relevant tragedy, such underuse will often go 
unnoticed: How do we know that something that might have 
been created or developed was not? How do we recognize a fail-
ure of coordination? 
Yochai Benkler, in his The Wealth of Networks: How Social 
Production Transforms Markets and Freedom,83 might be seen 
to offer the flip side of Heller’s story. In his account, dispersed 
ownership likewise plays a leading role, not in encouraging un-
deruse, but in changing the nature of mass production. Benk-
ler’s account thus highlights the rise of what he terms “peer 
production.”84 
In Benkler’s story, two phenomena have created a “net-
worked information economy”: first, the increasing importance 
of information, cultural production, and the manipulation of 
symbols (or branding) in the global economy; and second, the 
network structure of the Internet, in which processing power is 
distributed rather than concentrated.85 Within this economy, in 
turn, we can observe three shifts from traditional modes of eco-
nomic production. First, nonproprietary, even nonmarket, 
strategies become viable, given the distinct characteristics of 
information and cultural production.86 Second, such non-
market production can exert an impact far beyond what it could 
have achieved in the past, given the potentially infinite reach of 
the Internet.87 Finally, at the intersection of these two, there 
emerges the possibility of peer production, whereby large-scale 
coordinated efforts generate information, knowledge, and cul-
 
 80. See id. at 2. 
 81. For an amusing example, see id. at 6–7. 
 82. See id. at 2. 
 83. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006). 
 84. See id. at 62. 
 85. See id. at 3. 
 86. See id. at 105–06. 
 87. See id.  
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ture.88 Rather than production within the hierarchical firm or 
through arms-length transactions on the market, such produc-
tion engages untold millions of otherwise unaffiliated producers 
in the coordinated development of information goods.89 
Most familiar among Benkler’s examples is Wikipedia, 
within the framework of which a mass of dispersed, loosely or-
ganized Internet users have effectively coordinated inputs of 
information, knowledge, and time.90 The result is a free, readily 
accessible information resource with accuracy levels roughly 
comparable to traditional information resources such as the 
Encyclopedia Britannica.91 Only slightly less familiar an exam-
ple may be the open source Linux operating system, use of 
which has exploded over the last decade.92 Developed and con-
stantly improved through the coordinated efforts of otherwise 
unaffiliated software developers around the world, Linux is 
freely available for individual and institutional use under an 
open public license.93 Other examples of peer production can al-
so be identified, including social networks such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and the Flickr network for photo distribution.94 
Beyond the analysis of Heller and Benkler, the work of 
other authors is also suggestive of a growing appreciation of the 
dynamics of coordination. Consider Larry Lessig’s Remix: Mak-
ing Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy, his latest 
challenge to our conventional thinking about copyright regula-
tion.95 In Remix, Lessig highlights the growing emergence of a 
“Read-Write” (RW) culture alongside the prevailing “Read On-
ly” (RO) culture.96 In the former, by contrast with the latter, 
consumers no longer simply sit back and take in the informa-
 
 88. See id.  
 89. See id.  
 90. See id. at 70–74. 
 91. See Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopedias Go Head to Head: Jimmy Wales’ 
Wikipedia Comes Close to Brittanica in Terms of the Accuracy of its Science 
Entries, a Nature Investigation Finds, NATURE, Dec. 15, 2005, at 900, 900–01. 
 92. See generally H. Maura Lendon, The Linux Revolution, 15 INTELL. 
PROP. J. 143, 148, 156–57 (2000) (noting that the development of Linux as Open 
Source software was intended to take advantage of “hundreds of users providing 
feedback, suggestions for improvement and new code to fix bugs and enhance 
the program,” and to use “continual ‘peer review’” to improve its quality). 
 93. GNU General Public License: Version 2, LINUX ONLINE (June 1991), 
http://www.linux.org/info/gnu.html [hereinafter LINUX]. 
 94. See generally FACEBOOK (2010), http://www.facebook.com/; FLICKR 
(2010), http://www.flickr.com/; TWITTER (2010), http://twitter.com/. 
 95. See LESSIG, supra note 3, at 18–19. 
 96. See id. at 28–35. 
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tional, intellectual, and cultural goods they purchase. Rather, 
through existing and ever-advancing digital technologies, they 
actively engage in shaping and recreating those goods.97 In-
stead of a marketplace in which millions consume the products 
of a handful of producers—think here of broadcast television or 
analog music production and distribution—today everyone is a 
producer, a distributor, and a consumer.98 To similar effect is 
Clay Shirky’s Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing 
Without Organizations.99 Offering an even broader vision of 
coordinated action in the modern social and economic order, 
Shirky highlights the growing range of opportunities for joint, 
yet decentralized, action and initiative, and the impact of this 
pattern on social, economic, and even political life.100 Finally, 
even aspects of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s Nudge: 
Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness can 
be understood within a framework of coordination.101 Based on 
the findings of behavioral economics and psychology, they 
counsel the use of noncoercive, information-oriented “nudges” 
to shape individual choice—interventions that echo those fa-
vored by the emphasis on coordination I propose.102 
In each of these works, as in the analyses of Heller and 
Benkler, coordination is central to the story told.103 The insight 
offered by each author turns on the importance of coordination 
in the social and economic order. Conflict may well be present 
in the settings explored. It is not, however, at the heart of the 
motivations, incentives, and interactions we observe. Rather, 
 
 97. See id. at 28. 
 98. A further dimension of coordination might be seen in Lessig’s argu-
ments about the ways in which the economics of business is changing, includ-
ing through technologies that rely on freely contributed consumer data to gen-
erate value. Think here of Google’s PageRank system, and of Amazon.com’s 
and Netflix’s use of customer purchases (and page views) to improve the quali-
ty of their recommendations. See id. at 122–28. 
 99. CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING 
WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS (2008). 
 100. Id. Shirky describes, for example, the striking use of so-called flash 
mobs in antigovernment protests in Belarus. See id. at 166–71. Using text 
messaging and weblogs, such protests are quickly brought together, with little 
or no advance planning. In this way, they permit protest, while allowing orga-
nizers to more easily avoid detection. See id. 
 101. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
 102. See id. at 4–6. 
 103. See generally BENKLER, supra note 83 (describing the important of 
coordination); HELLER, supra note 62 (same); LESSIG, supra note 3 (same); 
SHIRKY, supra note 99 (same). 
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the operative challenge and the desired goal in these settings is 
to get people on the same page. They are stories of coordina-
tion. 
None of the authors explicitly acknowledge as much. More 
importantly, they do not engage with the coordination dynamic 
at work. Writing variously on property rights, Internet law, 
copyright, and other topics, they tend not to see themselves as 
writing on a common theme.104 This only further highlights the 
need to bring the dynamics of coordination in the modern social 
and economic order to the foreground of our analysis and to 
more fully engage with its consequences. In particular, it is es-
sential that we consider the implications of the coordination 
economy for the function and role of the modern regulatory 
state. 
II.  DEFECTION, COORDINATION, AND THE 
REGULATORY STATE   
From its varied manifestations in the financial markets, 
the Internet, and elsewhere, to its growing role in the scholarly 
literature, coordination emerges as a crucial dimension of mod-
ern social and economic life. But what is the significance of the 
rise of the coordination economy for law as opposed to econom-
ics or sociology? More specifically, what are its implications for 
the regulatory state? 
It is interesting, in this vein, to consider the place of law in 
the analysis of Heller, Benkler, Lessig, and other scholars who 
have begun to engage dynamics of coordination in the social 
and economic order. For the most part, law is absent. Where it 
does appear, it is most often cast as an obstacle to the desired 
result.105 In the pursuit of coordination, law and regulation 
emerge as something to be avoided or overcome. 
This should not be especially surprising, as it follows natu-
rally from our conventional thinking about both coordination 
and regulation. As suggested above, we begin with a sense of 
coordination as the particular responsibility of the market. In a 
market economy, the source of coordination is the price func-
 
 104. My point is not that these accounts all collapse into the same story; 
nor do I suggest that coordination explains everything that the authors ob-
serve. Rather, I simply suggest that each of the works’ divergent subjects and 
distinct conclusions have at their hearts a dynamic of coordination, which 
surely implies something. 
 105. See, e.g., LINUX, supra note 93 (describing the “threat” posed by soft-
ware patents). 
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tion.106 Regulation, conversely, has not commonly been seen as 
a vehicle for coordination.107 Our thinking on each count turns 
out to be wrong. 
To appreciate as much, as well as the implications of the 
coordination economy for the regulatory state, game theory of-
fers helpful insight. To be sure, as its detractors suggest, it is 
not fully determinate. There is far too much ambiguity in the 
definition of real-world payoffs to ground positive claims on 
game theory alone.108 Game theory constitutes a useful frame 
of analysis, however, so long as we do not inhale. 
In this spirit, the following discussion begins by highlight-
ing the common foundation of many of our traditional argu-
ments for regulatory intervention—externalities, the tragedy of 
the commons, and other collective action problems—in the fear 
of defection emphasized by the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Suggesting the limited relevance of this framework to coordina-
tion settings, I then offer the distinct construct of coordination 
games as a frame for analysis. Although less familiar to legal 
scholars, coordination games are no less relevant to the study 
of law and provide a more suitable approach to the areas of in-
terest herein. Finally, I conclude this part by identifying the 
distinct catalysts for regulatory intervention in settings defined 
by coordination versus defection and dismissing potential chal-
lenges to the need for regulation in coordination settings. 
 
 106. The important caveat to this lies in theories of the firm. See Edward 
B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and 
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1621–22 (2001). See 
generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 386 (1937). 
The firm constitutes a counterpoint to market-based coordination by way of 
price. Cf. CHANDLER, supra note 11, at 490. 
 107. To be sure, some have recognized as much. I have already noted the 
work of Richard McAdams. See supra note 18. In After the Rights Revolution, 
Sunstein highlights the role of regulation in responding not only to collective 
action problems, but to coordination problems as well. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 51–
52 (1990). Notably, though, he places relatively little emphasis on the latter 
functions. Further, he continues to emphasize the coercive role of regulation in 
those settings. Compare id. (“[C]oercion has an often overlooked facilitative 
function.”), with infra Part III.A.1 (highlighting the role of regulation in shap-
ing expectations rather than incentives). 
 108. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 45, 62 
(1994); JÜRGEN EICHBERGER, GAME THEORY FOR ECONOMISTS 1 (1993) (noting 
the reliance of game theory on rational players). From the opposite direction, I 
fully appreciate the relative simplicity of the 2x2 games on which I rely. For 
the purposes intended herein, however, a bracketing of additional players, 
mixed strategies, sequential versus simultaneous plays, and evolutionary pat-
terns may actually be most effective. See McAdams, supra note 18, at 211. 
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A. THE DILEMMA OF DEFECTION AND THE REGULATORY STATE 
As Richard McAdams has recently highlighted, legal schol-
ars’ use of game theory has focused almost exclusively on the 
well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma.109 In this familiar dynamic, 
each co-conspirator to a crime must decide whether to confess, 
given the threat of a far more severe sentence if she remains 
silent while her counterpart confesses, and the promise of a 
free pass if she alone chooses to sing like a bird. In such cir-
cumstances, the Prisoner’s Dilemma predicts that both prison-
ers will end up confessing, even though they would have been 
better off had they both held their tongues and refused to pro-
vide the prosecution with the evidence necessary for a convic-
tion.110 
The dispositive characteristic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
then, is a dynamic of defection.111 Although both social and pri-
vate utility are maximized if the players remain silent, their 
individual incentives lead them to defect from that optimal 
equilibrium and both end up worse off. The solution to the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, in turn, lies in altering players’ payoffs 
and thereby eliminating their incentive to defect.112 
In substantial part, our notions of regulation can be un-
derstood to turn on just such a vision of defection.113 Public 
goods, collective action, negative externality, and other familiar 
justifications for regulatory intervention are Prisoner’s Dilem-
mas at heart.114 Behind each argument is the fear that individ-
 
 109. See McAdams, supra note 18, at 214–15. 
 110. See ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 97 
(1991) (introducing the Prisoner’s Dilemma). For a more complete analysis, 
see AVINASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY 256–57 (1999).  
 111. See Susan Block-Lieb, Congress’ Temptation to Defect: A Political and 
Economic Theory of Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Prob-
lems, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 813 (1997); cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnoo-
kin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in 
Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 514–18 (1994) (discussing defection within 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma in the context of litigation). 
 112. See, e.g., Block-Lieb, supra note 111, at 818–19. 
 113. See, e.g., Gideon Doron, Administrative Regulation of an Industry: The 
Cigarette Case, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 163, 165–67 (1979) (describing regulation 
of defection in oligopolist cigarette advertising); see also Kent Greenfield, Us-
ing Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law 
as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 599 (2002) (noting the necessi-
ty of regulation to prevent defection-based market failures). 
 114. See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COLLABORATION 
AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 67–69 (1984); John K. Set-
ear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations 
Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139, 178 n.160 (1996). 
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uals and institutions will sometimes be incentivized to defect 
from optimal social arrangements and choices. The task of the 
regulatory state is to alter relevant payoffs and thereby prevent 
such defection.115 
Consider public goods arguments for regulation. In public 
goods settings, we find a resource that is a “common or collec-
tive benefit[] provided by government[]” regardless of one’s in-
dividual contribution to it.116 It is impossible, or at least diffi-
cult, to bar its use by additional consumers. Such use, on the 
other hand, does not preclude consumption by others.117 In such 
settings, individuals can be expected to free ride on the demand 
of others, consuming more than they are willing to contribute 
toward the relevant resource. 
This, of course, is precisely the dynamic of defection pre-
dicted by the Prisoner’s Dilemma.118 If all contribute their 
share toward production of the relevant public good—be it po-
lice protection, public roadways, national defense, scientific re-
search, or the proverbial lighthouse—social and private utility 
are maximized. The incentive of individuals and institutions to 
free ride by understating their demand for public goods, how-
ever, generates the opposite result. Writ large, such incentives 
dictate little or no production of public goods with concomitant 
losses to both social and private utility.119 
This is likewise the dynamic in the tragedy of the com-
mons, famously described by Garrett Hardin with reference to 
cattle grazing on a common plot.120 The tragedy arises because 
 
 115. See Doron, supra note 113, at 167; Greenfield, supra note 113, at 599; 
cf. Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 248–52 
(1998) (arguing that “systematic deviations from the rational-maximizer mod-
el” undermine the position of principled antipaternalism). 
 116. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 14 n.21, 
14–15 (1971). 
 117. Id.  
 118. See David W. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender 
Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 153, 188–90 (1986) (describing the tender offer prob-
lem in terms of free riders and the Prisoner’s Dilemma); McAdams, supra note 
18, at 215 n.24; David Schmidtz, Contracts and Public Goods, 10 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 475, 479–83 (1987). 
 119. Free-rider dynamics generally have similar effects. See Schmidtz, su-
pra note 118, at 475–82. 
 120. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 
1244 (1968). Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller describe commons property as 
“the axiomatic example of a prisoner’s dilemma.” Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. 
Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 555 (2001); see also THOMAS 
C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 110–15 (1978) (describing 
the tragedy of the commons as a Prisoner’s Dilemma); Lee Anne Fennell, 
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each herder is incentivized to maximize their individual gain by 
having as many cattle on the pasture as possible.121 The result, 
however, is over grazing.122 Similar tragedies might arise from 
residents’ use of a public park or the use of a local watershed 
for waste disposal. In each of these cases, individual defection 
from an optimal equilibrium of constrained consumption pro-
duces a net social and private loss. As Hardin eloquently put it, 
“[r]uin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pur-
suing his own best interest in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons.”123 
Broadly, in fact, the entire universe of collective action 
failures—public goods problems, tragedies of the commons, and 
free riding, among other arguments for regulatory interven-
tion—can be understood as stories of defection.124 As high-
lighted by Mancur Olson, collective action problems arise from 
the limited return to any given individual of addressing a social 
dilemma.125 Climate change regulation may be the timeliest 
example. Notwithstanding the collective utility of adjustment 
in this setting, individuals may seek to free ride, producing a 
net reduction in both social and private utility.126 Once again, 
individual defection—in this case, the failure to lend support to 
a common project—constitutes the critical impetus for regula-
tion. 
Our most basic arguments for regulatory intervention, 
then, arise out of a particular vision of the social and economic 
order. An emphasis on collective action problems, as well as 
negative externalities, markets for lemons, and information 
 
Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 944 (2004); Robert W. 
Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits of Doctrine, 
22 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 74 n.65 (2000); Anatol Rapoport, Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
in THE NEW PALGRAVE: GAME THEORY 199, 204 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 
1989) (noting that the Prisoner’s Dilemma becomes a version of the so-called 
tragedy of the commons when generalized to more than two participants). 
 121. See Hardin, supra note 120, at 1244. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., Lisa Schenck, Climate Change “Crisis”—Struggling for 
Worldwide Collective Action, COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 319, 335 (2008) 
(discussing climate change as a defection problem); see also Leebron, supra 
note 118, at 188–90 (describing defection in the context of tender offers); 
Schmidtz, supra note 118, at 479–83 (considering defection from investment in 
informational public goods); cf. Block-Lieb, supra note 111, at 810–20 (discuss-
ing defection in common pool problems). 
 125. Cf. OLSON, supra note 116, at 2 (“[R]ational, self-interested individu-
als will not act to achieve their common or group interests.”). 
 126. See Schenck, supra note 124, at 335–36. 
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failures, among other market failures, speaks to a world in 
which the incentives of individuals and institutions will some-
times—if not often—motivate them to deviate from optimal 
equilibria.127 The prevention of such defection emerges as the 
key function of the regulatory state.128 
B. FROM DEFECTION TO COORDINATION 
A dynamic of defection is not the story at work in the coor-
dination economy. In discouraging bank runs, encouraging 
bank lending, and otherwise fostering investment in the finan-
cial markets, defection is not the concern. If others are main-
taining deposits, lending, and investing, there is limited indi-
vidual incentive to deviate from that course. Few are 
incentivized to abandon the Internet or electrical grid to create 
their own network. The same might be said, if to a lesser de-
gree, of the increasingly popular world of online social net-
works. If all my friends are on Facebook, I have little interest 
in moving to MySpace. The prospect of defection is likewise of 
limited relevance in standard setting, innovation, and the other 
coordination settings described above. 
The important work of John Maynard Smith in evolution-
ary biology offers another vantage to appreciate as much. In 
Smith’s account, the Prisoner’s Dilemma can be reconceived as 
a “skulling game,” in which a pair of rowers each hold a set of 
oars that extend out both sides of their boat. Here, we face our 
conventional worries of free riding and holdout problems, given 
 
 127. Individuals and institutions are motivated to deviate from optimal 
equilibria in circumstances cognizable as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. See supra 
notes 111–15 and accompanying text. Negative externalities are similarly 
grounded in Prisoner’s Dilemma stories of defection. See Fennell, supra note 
120, at 944; Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of Interna-
tional Securities Regulation, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 61, 88–89 (1999). Even pat-
terns of information asymmetry and natural monopoly have been cast as spe-
cies of Prisoner’s Dilemmas. See, e.g., Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, 
When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 68 (2000) (describing a Prisoner’s Dilemma dynamic 
in information disclosure); John Shepard Wiley Jr., Reciprocal Altruism as a 
Felony: Antitrust and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1914–20 
(1988) (analyzing cartels using the Prisoner’s Dilemma); John Simpson & 
Abraham L. Wickelgren, Bundled Discounts, Leverage Theory, and Down-
stream Competition, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 370, 370 (2007) (linking dynamics 
at work in monopoly settings to the Prisoner’s Dilemma). “Market for lemons” 
problems are especially suitable to a Prisoner’s Dilemma frame of analysis. 
See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970). 
 128. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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the ability of each passenger to shirk their responsibility to 
row.129 By contrast is the only slightly—yet dramatically—
modified “rowing game,” in which each rower holds only one 
oar, extending out opposite sides of the boat. With this minor 
modification, the payoffs to free riding or holding out suddenly 
disappear. Instead, we face the distinct challenge of coordinat-
ing behavior.130 
An emphasis on the Prisoner’s Dilemma and its dynamics 
of defection in framing the world faced by the regulatory state 
will therefore no longer suffice. A new account is necessary to 
accommodate the important, and increasingly widespread, 
manifestations of a coordination economy. 
A distinct strand of game theory turns out to offer an al-
ternative. This is the dynamic of coordination games. Here, as 
in the settings described above, the essential story is not one of 
defection, but of coordination. 
Although unfamiliar to legal scholars in comparison with 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the basic intuition behind coordination 
games turns out to be familiar. Perhaps most routinely, coordi-
nation-game dynamics have been highlighted in the choice of 
driving on the left or the right.131 Even in this basic setting, we 
can see the characteristic feature of a coordination game: the 
presence of multiple Nash equilibria.132 Whether both drive on 
the right or both drive on the left, the result will be stable. A 
driver will not abandon either the drive-on-the-right or the 
drive-on-the-left equilibrium, unless the other driver shifts as 
well. There is also the potential for catastrophic coordination 
failure, however, absent communication or relevant law or 
norms dictating where to drive. 
Only slightly less familiar may be the so-called Meeting 
Place game. Here, players who have been separated from one 
another—whether friends in New York City, spouses in a de-
partment store, or otherwise—must find each other.133 Having 
failed to arrange a meeting place in advance and lacking the 
 
 129. See JOHN MAYNARD SMITH & EÖRS SZATHMÁRY, THE MAJOR 
TRANSITIONS IN EVOLUTION 261–62 (1995). 
 130. See id. 
 131. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
363, 378 n.70 (2004). 
 132. See Vincent P. Crawford & Hans Haller, Learning How to Cooperate: 
Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games, 58 ECONOMETRICA 571, 571–
72 (1990). 
 133. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–56 (1960). 
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ability to communicate,134 the dynamic that emerges is one of 
coordination. To locate one another, each must develop expecta-
tions of the likely behavior of the other. More precisely, they 
must develop an accurate expectation of what their counterpart 
will expect of them.135 
Given the lack of conflict in this setting, this is a game of 
“pure coordination.”136 This is apparent in the normal form re-
presentation of the Meeting Place game, with its symmetric 
payoffs to both players. Both the player choosing along the ver-
tical axis, whose payoff from each strategy is listed first, and 
the player choosing along the horizontal axis receive a payoff of 
five if they successfully locate one another.137 
 
 Penn Station Grand Central 
Penn Station (5,5) (0,0) 
Grand Central (0,0) (5,5) 
 
As with the choice between driving on the right or the left, 
we find multiple Nash equilibria here: meeting at Penn Station 
or at Grand Central Station.138 Each strategy is stable; neither 
player has any incentive to abandon a choice of location if they 
expect their counterpart to choose it. Efficient coordination con-
sequently depends on each player developing an accurate ex-
pectation of whether their counterpart is likely to go to one sta-
tion or to the other. To do so, the necessarily circular challenge 
for each is to determine where her counterpart will likely ex-
 
 134. Thomas Schelling first described the Meeting Place game decades be-
fore invention of the mobile phone. Today, one might simply imagine having 
an iPhone in New York, but being unable to get a signal from AT&T. See Mike 
Zapler, Wireless Data Logjam a Looming Crisis, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 
Feb. 7, 2010, at 1A, available at 2010 WLNR 2676654. 
 135. SCHELLING, supra note 133, at 54; see also Diamond & Dybvig, supra 
note 31, at 404 (“In contrast, a bank run in our model is caused by a shift in 
expectations . . . .”). 
 136. See Judith Mehta et al., The Nature of Salience: An Experimental In-
vestigation of Pure Coordination Games, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 658, 658 (1994). 
 137. Throughout this Article, I state the operative game payoffs as {Row 
Player, Column Player}, with Row Player’s choices demarcated on the vertical 
axis and Column Player’s choices on the horizontal axis. 
 138. Where relevant drivers have no preference between driving on the right 
or left side of the road, that choice is likewise captured by this set of payoffs. 
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pect her to go, based upon where she expects the other to ex-
pect her to go, ad infinitum. 
Assuming the above payoffs, this recursive exercise in ex-
pectation formation is necessary to avoid the coordination fail-
ure of going to different locations. The need for consistent ex-
pectations becomes even more acute where one coordination 
point is preferable to the other. A Pareto-ordering of relevant 
coordination equilibria thus introduces a further dimension of 
potential coordination failure. 
Here, our friends continue to be separated in New York, 
but both are within blocks of Grand Central Station. We con-
tinue to have multiple Nash equilibria, as a meeting at either 
location would be a stable coordination point, from which nei-
ther would deviate or defect. Given their proximity to Grand 
Central Station, however, meeting there is a dramatically su-
perior choice.139 Besides non-coordination, therefore, there ex-
ists a further possibility of coordination failure—meeting at the 
“wrong” place. 
 
 Penn Station Grand Central 
Penn Station (3,3) (0,0) 
Grand Central (0,0) (6,6) 
 
As in the coordination settings described above, the issue 
in these games is not defection. This remains true, as I will 
demonstrate below, even as we shift to more realistic coordina-
tion game settings where players’ preferences conflict, some-
times dramatically.140 The irrelevance of defection, however, 
does not eliminate the potential for suboptimal results. Coordi-
nation games simply involve a distinct set of potential market 
failures. 
A disconnect emerges, then, between the vision of the 
world on which traditional accounts of the regulatory state rely 
and the rise of the coordination economy. Conventional ration-
ales for the regulatory state posit a world of Prisoner’s Dilem-
mas, in which the state must intervene to alter individual and 
institutional incentives to defect from socially optimal equili-
 
 139. Grand Central Station, of course, figured prominently in Schelling’s 
experimental studies of coordination. See SCHELLING, supra note 133, at 55 n.1. 
 140. See infra Part II.C. 
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bria. Critical aspects of modern social and economic life, how-
ever, are not effectively captured by this vision. Instead, these 
are stories of coordination. 
In these settings, we do better to look to coordination 
games in seeking to understanding the dynamic at work. The 
point is not simply one of classification, however, or an abstract 
analytical exercise. In shifting from the Prisoner’s Dilemma to 
coordination games, we arrive at a distinct vision of both the 
function and form of regulation.141 Where coordination is the 
operative demand on the regulatory state, the design of rele-
vant regulation might be better keyed to that need. Our halting 
and muddled approach to the regulation of areas including the 
financial markets, the Internet, standard setting, and innova-
tion, meanwhile, might be better explained by our inattention 
to the actual dynamics at work than any failure of regulation 
as such.142 
C. DILEMMAS OF COORDINATION 
At first glance, the rise of the coordination economy might 
be seen as a manifesto for contraction of the regulatory state. 
Recall, once again, the notion of coordination as precisely the 
task that the market is designed to achieve. From that perspec-
tive, where coordination is the operative dynamic and defection 
is not a concern, regulatory intervention is unnecessary. Efforts 
at deregulation, the privatization of traditionally public func-
tions, aspirations to end “big government,” and an emphasis on 
 
 141. As I will describe below, see infra Part III.B.4, besides the coordina-
tion settings described in Part I, coordination-oriented regulatory approaches 
may also have application in those settings in which the Prisoner’s Dilemma is 
played in indefinite repeat plays. In the latter circumstances, the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma can essentially be understood to be transmuted into a coordination 
game. Cf. Peter Huber, Competition, Conglomerates, and the Evolution of Co-
operation, 93 YALE L.J. 1147, 1151 (1984) (arguing that the marketplace set-
ting differs from the classic formulation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma because a 
firm can alter its strategic choice while it is being made in response to the be-
havior of other firms). 
 142. See, e.g., Robert W. Crandall & J. Gregory Sidak, Is Structural Sepa-
ration of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition?, 19 
YALE J. ON REG. 335, 339–40 (2002) (criticizing proposed telecommunications 
regulation as based upon the false premise that market failures are the result 
of anticompetitive behavior by incumbent local exchange carriers rather than 
a problem of integration and coordination); Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 196–210 
(arguing that improper regulation of financial markets arises from a failure to 
understand the nature and sources of systemic risk). See generally Kesan & 
Gallo, supra note 5, at 1502–05 (discussing the need to understand the opera-
tion of markets on the Internet in order to design effective Internet regulation). 
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tax cuts might be justified by the heightened place of coordina-
tion in social and economic life.143 
Legal scholars’ single-minded orientation to the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is in accord with this view.144 Both positive and nor-
mative accounts of the regulatory state have emphasized the 
dynamic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, while disregarding coordi-
nation games.145 At least in part, this might be traced to an un-
derstanding of coordination along the above lines. Where coor-
dination games capture the dynamic at work, the logic goes, 
law and regulation have little to add. Optimal coordination 
simply happens.146 
But coordination failures turn out to be a real risk in set-
tings including the financial markets, the encouragement of in-
novation, and standard setting. In any number of ways, coordi-
nation may not simply happen. As suggested above, this begins 
with the possibility of non-coordination.147 In this case, relevant 
actors enter a given market but fail to coordinate around a 
common equilibrium.148 The persistence of multiple standards 
in settings where harmonization might be preferable consti-
tutes just such a coordination failure.149 This result is common, 
meanwhile, as suggested by the persistence of both metric and 
Imperial systems of weights and measures,150 the division be-
tween CDMA and GSM cellular network technologies in the 
 
 143. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft Law” 
in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 457, 494–96 (2004) 
(advocating voluntary environmental regulation of the oil and gas industry 
given the growth of a global coordination economy). 
 144. See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text; cf. Robert B. Ahdieh, 
From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Nature of Mod-
ern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 18–21 (2007) (listing multiple authors who 
have turned to a coordination model in rejecting traditional regulatory mod-
els); McAdams, supra note 18, at 256–57 (explaining that while a focus on 
Prisoner’s Dilemma makes regulatory sanctions central, coordination games 
tend to lead to a focus on nonstate actors and nonregulatory solutions). 
 145. McAdams, supra note 18, at 210–13. 
 146. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 1649, 1710 (2000) (theorizing that where the options are apparent to 
the participants in a coordination game, “a convention might spontaneously 
arise in which everyone followed the [efficient] strategy”). 
 147. See supra Part II.B. 
 148. Id.  
 149. See McAdams, supra note 18, at 238–39. 
 150. See Lewis M. Branscomb, The Metric System in the United States, 116 
PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 294, 298 (1972). 
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United States and Europe,151 and, most broadly, the challenges 
attendant to the use of multiple languages and currencies 
among geographically proximate or otherwise closely associated 
nations.152 
Even where coordination does occur, it may not be at the 
optimal coordination point. Recalling the Pareto-ranked Meet-
ing Place game outlined above, this was the result when our 
two friends met at Penn Station, rather than the more prox-
imate Grand Central Station.153 Myriad examples of this spe-
cies of coordination failure have likewise been offered: our coor-
dination around the purportedly inefficient QWERTY 
keyboard, the success of the (inferior) VHS over the (superior) 
Betamax video recording standard, and the long persistence of 
unanimous action clauses in sovereign debt contracts governed 
by U.S. law as opposed to the more efficient collective action 
clauses used in Europe.154 
Such coordination around an inefficient equilibrium arises 
from a status quo bias of sorts and the resulting lock-in of a 
prevailing standard in coordination settings. In the face of 
coordination dynamics, my preferred coordination point de-
pends on your preference and vice versa, such that our choices 
are interdependent. Because of this, neither of us is incenti-
vized to abandon even a suboptimal coordination point unless 
the other abandons it as well. 
This, of course, suggests yet a further possibility of coordi-
nation failure. Given the interdependence of our strategies, a 
once-optimal coordination equilibrium may persist, even after 
some exogenous change has rendered it inefficient. Commonly, 
such lock-in has been identified in settings where innovation is 
lacking. After playing a trailblazing role in the early years of 
software development, for example, Microsoft has come to be 
perceived as a relative laggard in innovation.155 Yet its domi-
 
 151. See Michael R. Franzinger, Latent Dangers in a Patent Pool: The Eu-
ropean Commission’s Approval of the 3G Wireless Technology Licensing 
Agreements, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1693, 1698–99 (2003). 
 152. Cf. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language and Participation, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 687, 692–93 (2006) (discussing the challenges posed by multilingualism). 
 153. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 154. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transi-
tion in the Shadow of the International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 691, 694 (2004); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and 
Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1132 (2002). 
 155. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, As Browsers Battle, Consumers Stand to 
Win, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, at B7, available at 2009 WLNR 5644216. 
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nant market share has persisted because of the strong coordi-
nation equilibrium around its operating system and other desk-
top software.156 The same story might be told with regard to the 
use of the wireless spectrum in the United States, which has 
lagged significantly behind its competitors in relevant innova-
tion.157 
Given each of the foregoing possibilities, a final potential 
coordination failure is a kind of barrier to entry. Given the 
risks of non-coordination or coordination around an inefficient 
equilibrium, relevant market participants may simply avoid a 
given market. A prime example of this may be high-definition 
television. Notwithstanding availability of the necessary tech-
nology for decades, HDTV only became commercially available 
in the last several years. In significant part, this can traced to 
the hesitation of producers of both equipment and program-
ming to enter the market, given the lack of a common HDTV 
standard.158 
There is no lack of potential, then, for significant failures of 
efficiency in coordination settings. Yet legal scholars have 
largely ignored the implications of this possibility for the regu-
latory state. Even in the face of the familiar examples offered 
above, coordination failures have gone unaddressed by regula-
tion theory. 
At least in part, one can trace to the aforementioned sense 
of coordination as the responsibility of the market. Beyond 
that, this inattention may arise from a pair of flawed assump-
tions about the nature and achievement of coordination. The 
first is the notion that coordination dynamics are inherently 
nonconflictual.159 The world of coordination, in this strikingly 
widespread view, is limited to the fairly uncommon patterns of 
pure coordination noted above—which side of the road to drive 
on, where to find a friend in New York, or the like. The second 
assumption is that communication constitutes a panacea in 
coordination settings—that it is both viable and effective in 
 
 156. See Allan Hoffman, Predictions and Wishes for the New Year, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 31, 2009, at 29, available at 2009 WLNR 
26207850.  
 157. See HELLER, supra note 62, at 81. 
 158. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role 
of Law in the Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 
310–11 (2003). I will return to these various possibilities of coordination fail-
ure infra Part III.B.1. 
 159. See Russell Cooper et al., Communication in Coordination Games, 107 
Q.J. ECON. 739, 765–66 (1992). 
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generating efficient coordination results.160 Each of these as-
sumptions proves false upon closer examination. 
The core characteristic of coordination games, once again, 
is the presence of multiple Nash equilibria.161 Such multiplicity 
of equilibria, however, is not unique to nonconflictual settings. 
Rather, it can be found in settings of conflict as well. Thomas 
Schelling, recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics for his 
work on coordination games, offered much of this insight in a 
volume artfully titled The Strategy of Conflict.162 Two standard 
coordination game frameworks help to highlight the potential 
for conflict amidst coordination. 
In each of these settings, players have conflicting interests, 
but these are trumped by their dominant preference for coordi-
nation. Consider the Battle of the Sexes game. A wife and hus-
band have decided to spend an evening together but respective-
ly prefer to go to a boxing match and to the ballet.163 In 2x2 
form, with the wife’s choice on the vertical axis (and listed first 
in the payoffs), this account yields the following results: 
 
 Ballet Boxing Match 
Ballet (5,10) (-5,-5) 
Boxing Match (2,2) (10,5) 
 
Self-evidently, the parties’ preferences in this case are in 
conflict. The wife receives a far higher payoff where both go to 
the boxing match, while the husband receives that superior 
payoff if they attend the ballet. Multiple equilibria remain, 
however, with stable and Pareto superior coordination points 
(i.e., evenings spent together) at either the ballet or the boxing 
match. Coordination failure is likewise a possibility, where they 
end up separated—either at their preferred or (in the worse-
 
 160. Id.; see also SCHELLING, supra note 133, at 109–10 (conjecturing that 
even with full communication, participants in coordination games may still 
reach unfavorable outcomes). 
 161. See supra notes 31, 35, 132, 138 and accompanying text. 
 162. See SCHELLING, supra note 133. 
 163. One might alternatively conceive of this pattern as a modified Meeting 
Place game. Imagine the same separation of friends in New York City de-
scribed above, see supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text, but with one 
starting in the vicinity of Penn Station, while the other is near Grand Central 
Station. 
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case scenario) at their disfavored location. Notwithstanding the 
couple’s conflicting preferences, their decisionmaking plays out 
within a framework of coordination. The dominant preference 
of both spouses is to be together; each simply prefers a different 
venue for doing so. 
The consistency of conflict with coordination becomes even 
clearer when we incorporate an even greater degree of conflict. 
In Hawk-Dove games,164 each player must choose between an 
aggressive pattern of engagement (i.e., playing Hawk) or a def-
erential strategy (i.e., playing Dove). Higher payoffs accrue to 
playing Hawk to the other player’s Dove, but significantly neg-
ative payoffs result from the conflict scenario of a {Hawk-
Hawk} strategy.165 
 
 Dove Hawk 
Dove (5,5) (0,10) 
Hawk (10,0) (-5,-5) 
 
Even here, we continue to have a coordination dynamic. 
Notwithstanding the sharp degree of conflict and the counter-
vailing nature of the parties’ strategy choices in equilibrium, 
those who play Hawk-Dove—including teenagers racing their 
cars toward one another in the game of Chicken166—are en-
gaged in a game of coordination. Thus, consider the player on 
the vertical axis in the payoff matrix, above. If she expects the 
driver choosing along the horizontal axis to play Dove, she 
should play Hawk, giving her a payoff of ten. If she expects her 
counterpart to play Hawk, on the other hand, she should play 
Dove. She receives no payoff in this scenario, of course, but this 
is better than the negative payoff of playing Hawk.167 Again, we 
find multiple Nash equilibria from which neither player is in-
centivized to defect absent a change in behavior by her coun-
 
 164. More colloquially, Hawk-Dove games are known by the name Chicken, 
in which two cars race toward one another and the chicken is the one who 
swerves first. Cf. Robert B. Ahdieh, The Role of Groups in Norm Transforma-
tion: A Dramatic Sketch, in Three Parts, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231, 261 (2005). 
 165. See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 110, at 447–52. 
 166. Or their tractors, if you prefer, as in Footloose. The version of Chicken 
played in Rebel Without a Cause has slightly different payoffs, given Jim and 
Buzz’s race toward a cliff, rather than toward each other. 
 167. In the game of Chicken, thus, it is better to swerve than to crash. 
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terpart. The result? The players develop interdependent strate-
gies and experience a coordination game. 
Dynamics of coordination, then, are no less salient in the 
face of conflict. The presence of conflict in real-world coordina-
tion settings, such as the financial markets, does nothing to 
preclude a coordination-game analysis. To be sure, conflicting 
interests may impact choices of regulatory form, given their in-
troduction of distributional issues not present in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma or nonconflictual coordination games.168 For the same 
reason, the presence of conflict may impact either the urgency 
and/or the complexity of relevant regulation. That coordination 
dynamics are at work in a given area, however, offers no assur-
ance that regulation is unnecessary or superfluous. 
This points to the second false assumption behind legal 
scholars’ relative inattention to coordination: a belief that 
communication will alleviate any potential coordination failure 
that might arise.169 In the pure coordination cases described in 
the preceding section, an inability to communicate was as-
sumed. Had communication been available, there could be no 
coordination failure.170 With some caveats, this might be said of 
certain other types of coordination games as well.171 
Even in such nonconflictual games, it is important to rec-
ognize the limits of communication as we move toward an n-
person game. With additional participants, the transaction 
 
 168. See McAdams, supra note 18, at 212–13. 
 169. If we define communication as the distribution of perfect information, 
it does hold the solution to even conflictual coordination games. For present 
purposes, however, I am concerned with communication in the more conven-
tional sense. 
 170. Communication intended to promote coordination may sometimes be 
foreclosed by regulation itself. Such communication among competitors—
including under the rubric of standard-setting organizations—might thus be 
conceived as a collusive violation of antitrust rules. See Mark A. Lemley, Intel-
lectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 
1889, 1943 (2002). From this perspective, antitrust law might itself be thought 
of as regulatory treatment of coordination. It is the flip side of the analysis 
herein, however, because of its deterrent, rather than facilitative, impact. 
 171. Even in Stag Hunt (or assurance) games, communication may not 
eliminate the possibility of coordination failure. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
envisioned such games, a player might abandon coordinated strategies in ex-
change for a smaller, but more certain, gain. Rousseau explained that, “[i]f it 
was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain 
faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, 
we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple.” 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE IN INEQUALITY 111 (M. Cranston 
trans., 1984). 
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costs of effective communication often increases dramatical-
ly.172 In choosing a common standard for a given Internet pro-
tocol, for example, full communication may be all but impossi-
ble. The same might be said of many of the most critical 
coordination settings. 
Thus, the herd behavior and contagion effects at work in 
financial crises involve far more players than could readily be 
brought into effective communication with one another. Large 
numbers likewise plague some subset of the pharmaceutical 
innovation cases that Michael Heller notes, the processes of 
peer production suggested by Yochai Benkler, and the copy-
right dynamics that Larry Lessig cites as obstacles to a robust 
RW culture.173 In the settings of interest to Lessig, even the 
identification of those with relevant rights may prevent effec-
tive communication. Given the wide pool of relevant consumers, 
many standard-setting decisions will be to similar effect.174 
Even if the transaction costs of communication among 
large numbers of relevant actors can be overcome, communica-
tion still cannot assure efficient coordination where conflict is 
present. Consider a standard-setting battle in which relevant 
 
 172. See OLSON, supra note 116, at 18–19. This highlights a distinct 
framework within which the coordination-driven interactions I emphasize 
herein might be understood. Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. and Howard E. McCurdy 
sharply critique the market failure framework within which collective action 
problems, externalities, and the like are commonly understood—and that my 
analysis seeks to extend by integrating coordination failures as well. In place 
of that framework, they favor a transaction-cost analysis of public interven-
tions in the market. In their approach, intervention depends not on the identi-
fication of a market failure—be it a collective action problem, an externality, 
or the coordination failures I add to the conventional litany—but on the gov-
ernment’s ability to reduce transaction costs: “In general, anytime government 
can reduce private transaction costs or its own costs of provision, it should do 
so regardless of whether or not an externality exists. It need not wait for the 
appearance of an externality to effect a justification.” Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & 
Howard E. McCurdy, The Failure of Market Failure, 18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
& MGMT. 558, 565 (1999); see also Richard R. Nelson, Roles of Government in a 
Mixed Economy, 6 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 541, 543 (1987) (“Does it make 
sense to say that we need government to do these things because of ‘market 
failure’? Or is it more useful to keep in mind that certain functions of govern-
ment need to be in place for markets to do what we want them to do?”). This 
account is equally conducive to my emphasis on coordination, if not even more 
so. Regulatory interventions in the service of coordination—in standard-
setting, for example, which Zerbe and McCurdy highlight—may thus be 
among the most important sources of transaction-cost savings. See Zerbe & 
McCurdy, supra, at 572. 
 173. See supra Part I. 
 174. In some cases of standard setting, of course, the ability to communi-
cate will suffice to ensure optimal coordination. 
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preferences diverge, perhaps significantly. Recurrent standards 
contests between Microsoft and Google are suggestive.175 For 
each, the promise of a significantly expanded market share fa-
vors coordination around a common standard. Alongside this 
strong desire for a single standard, however, is an equally 
strong preference for each company to pursue its own interests. 
Given such conflicting preferences, communication is no 
panacea. In the extreme case, it might even reduce the poten-
tial for efficient coordination. Consider a modified Battle-of-the-
Sexes game, with payoffs adjusted to reflect a much greater net 
utility of going to the boxing match. Assume that the wife deep-
ly loves boxing, while the husband’s attendance at the ballet is 
more a matter of social convention than any real interest in pir-
ouettes and the pas de deux. 
 
 
 
Given the presence of conflicting interests, communication 
will not necessarily ensure coordination in the lower-right, Pa-
reto-superior quadrant. To begin, any such communication it-
self will be strategic in nature. Further, such communication 
plays out in the shadow of whatever salience a given coordina-
tion point enjoys, independent of its Pareto superiority or infe-
riority. Consider each limitation in turn. 
In the coordination game at work in any form of bargaining 
among parties, a party’s communications are designed to estab-
lish an expectation that her commitment point (the point 
beyond which she asserts she will not concede further) is in fact 
her reservation point (the actual point beyond which she will 
not concede further).176 Communication in the Battle-of-the-
 
 175. See Microsoft v. Google: When Clouds Collide, ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 
2008, at 69, available at 2008 WLNR 1483992. 
 176. See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1033, 1051–53 (2006). The limiting factor is the counterparty’s own reserva-
tion point. It thus accomplishes little to create expectations of a commitment 
point outside the bargaining zone of one’s counterparty. See id. at 1051–52. 
 Ballet Boxing Match 
Ballet (5,10) (-5,-5) 
Boxing Match (2,4) (20,5) 
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Sexes thus consists of each spouse trying to convince the oth-
er—by hook or crook—of his or her unwillingness to go to the 
disfavored venue. In the presence of this type of conflict, conse-
quently, communication does not assure efficient coordination. 
Such strategic communication, moreover, plays out against 
a backdrop of preexisting focal points for decision. Even if the 
communications of a particular player do not alter her counter-
part’s expectations in ways that produce a Pareto-inferior equi-
librium, a relevant focal point may lead to that result. If the 
upper-left quadrant in our Pareto-ranked Battle-of-the-Sexes is 
focal for some reason—perhaps the ballet is closer to home, the 
couple already has tickets for it, or some friends will also be at-
tending—it may emerge regardless of any opportunity to com-
municate.177 
Ultimately, an optimal strategy may even involve cutting 
off communication. As Schelling suggests, in a telephone con-
versation with her husband, the wife in the Battle-of-the-Sexes 
game might simply declare, “I’m leaving for the boxing match!,” 
and hang up the phone.178 Similarly, in military conflict, a 
combatant whose preferred position enjoys some focal power 
might take advantage of a loss of communication to advance 
her strategic objectives.179 
Contrary to our standard assumptions, coordination cannot 
be promised to arise as a matter of spontaneous order, whether 
because of the limits of communication or the presence of some 
dimension of conflict. Coordination failures of the sorts de-
scribed above may therefore emerge. If regulation may conse-
quently have a role to play in coordination settings, what impli-
cations follow as to issues of regulatory design? Given the 
divergence in the justifications for regulation in coordination 
settings, the form of regulation can likewise be expected to 
change. With the shift from the Prisoner’s Dilemma to coordi-
 
 177. In contract negotiations, I have identified contracting norms to be a 
potential source of such salience. See id. at 1053–55. 
 178. See SCHELLING, supra note 133, at 146 (“When the outcome depends 
on coordination, the timely destruction of communication may be a winning 
tactic. When a man and his wife are arguing by telephone over where to meet 
for dinner, the argument is won by the wife if she simply announces where she 
is going and hangs up. And the status quo is often preserved by a person who 
evades discussion of alternatives, even to the extent of simply turning off his 
hearing aid.”). 
 179. Beyond the presence of conflict and the limits of communication, in-
complete information and uncertainty regarding relevant third parties may be 
further obstacles to efficient coordination. See DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE 
ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 113–14 (1991). 
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nation-game dynamics, we must embrace a kind of New Regu-
lation. 
III.  THE NEW REGULATION   
Nearly a half-century ago, Charles Reich famously wrote of 
the emergence of the “New Property.”180 In Reich’s telling, the 
ubiquity of the modern administrative state—apparent in the 
far-reaching tentacles of the welfare system, substantial gov-
ernment employment and contracting, and critical state licens-
ing requirements—had made the state a significant source of 
wealth and thereby established a new set of property entitle-
ments. With the growing importance of dynamics of coordina-
tion in the social and economic order of modern industrialized 
nations, one might consider the possibility of a similar trans-
formation in the nature of regulation. If a growing proportion of 
the demands on the regulatory state are grounded in coordina-
tion, a New Regulation may be in order as well.181 
If coordination constitutes a distinct justification for regu-
latory intervention in important areas of the social and econom-
ic order, we might likewise expect the form of relevant regula-
tion to be distinct. Of course, one can only analyze this question 
in a given context.182 Minimally, distinct strategic dynamics in 
one setting versus another, and resulting game structures, will 
counsel distinct regulatory forms. Even the sources of relevant 
regulation—the level of government at which intervention oc-
curs and the institution charged with its introduction—might 
be expected to vary. By parsing through significant dimensions 
of a shift from preventing defection to facilitating coordination, 
however, we can discern certain common strands of a coordina-
tion-driven regulatory regime. 
To that end, this Part considers three shifts in emphasis 
attendant to a focus on facilitating coordination rather than 
preventing defection: from altering incentives to shaping expec-
tations, from dominant strategies to multiple equilibria, and 
from a focus on individuals to an emphasis on groups. To paint 
a more concrete picture of a coordination-driven regulatory ap-
proach, finally, I conclude with a specific application of the 
framework I suggest. Focusing on the U.S. response to the re-
 
 180. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 787 (1964). 
 181. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest a precise analogy to Reich’s ac-
count. His emphasis on the changing function and impact of the regulatory 
state, however, echoes the argument I make in this Article. 
 182. See Rubin, supra note 20, at 1425–26. 
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cent financial crisis, I consider both how that response fares 
from a coordination perspective and how that response might 
have been improved upon had the United States better appre-
ciated the centrality of coordination. 
A. FROM INCENTIVES TO EXPECTATIONS 
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, each player’s rational response 
to her individual incentives generates the inefficient result.183 
In coordination games, by contrast, players’ incentives do not 
dictate any necessary inefficiency.184 Nothing in the relevant 
payoffs predicts suboptimal results. Rather, coordination fail-
ure—whether by dint of non-coordination, coordination at a 
suboptimal equilibrium, or inefficient lock-in—is a result of 
players’ flawed expectations of one another.185 
The solution to coordination games does not lie in the alter-
ation of incentives, but in the facilitation of accurate expecta-
tions of one another.186 As Schelling puts it, “[w]hat is neces-
sary is to coordinate predictions, to read the same message in 
the common situation, to identify the one course of action that 
their expectations of each other can converge on. They must 
‘mutually recognize’ some unique signal that coordinates their 
expectations of each other.”187 Expectations are consequently 
the appropriate target of any regulatory intervention in coordi-
nation settings. It is to the shaping of expectations, rather than 
the alteration of incentives, that coordination-driven regulation 
speaks. At least three important implications arise from this 
distinct emphasis. First, it points to a role for various noncoer-
cive regulatory tools and approaches. Second, it suggests the 
centrality of information in regulatory function and design. 
Third, it highlights a complex relationship to the efforts of Cass 
Sunstein and others to address the cognitive biases in deci-
sionmaking observed by behavioral psychology and economics. 
1. Regulation Beyond Coercion 
Conventional notions of regulation see it as inculcating at 
least some dimension of coercion. It is the very fact of its coer-
 
 183. See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 110, at 274. 
 184. See McAdams, supra note 18, at 256–57. 
 185. See SCHELLING, supra note 133, at 21; Ahdieh, supra note 176, at 
1053; McAdams, supra note 18, at 231. 
 186. More precisely, it turns on each one’s ability to determine what other 
players are likely to expect of them. See SCHELLING, supra note 133, at 54. 
 187. Id. 
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cion that makes it regulation.188 This is unsurprising, given the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma conception of the task at hand. Where the 
regulatory project is to alter the incentives of private actors—in 
the terms of game theory, to alter the payoffs to different strat-
egies—regulation will ordinarily have some coercive quality. It 
is in this way that it alters baseline payoffs.189 
Environmental regulation imposes costs on the creation of 
pollution externalities to disincentivize their production. The 
imposition of limits on relevant outputs obviously does so. In 
recent proposals for a cap-and-trade system for carbon emis-
sions, the intent to alter incentives is even clearer.190 A similar 
account can be given of workplace safety, in which employers’ 
competitive incentive to deviate from safety norms is disabled 
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s man-
datory standards.191 
The shaping of players’ expectations in coordination set-
tings, by contrast, involves no necessary dimension of com-
mand-and-control. A player may alter expectations in any 
number of noncoercive ways, including cheap talk, signaling, 
information-provision, and the like. Where the operative ques-
tion is what each player expects of the other, such noncoercive 
measures can be quite effective.192 
Schelling highlighted the function of “focal points” in avoid-
ing potential coordination failures.193 Specifically, he posited 
the existence of some complex cognitive process by which indi-
viduals develop coherent expectations of the behavior of others. 
In the effort of two friends to find each other in New York, for 
example, Schelling suggested that the focal quality of certain 
 
 188. CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC 2.0, at 159 (2008); Edward Glaeser, Coer-
cive Regulation and the Balance of Freedom, CATO UNBOUND (May 11, 2007), 
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2007/05/11/edward-glaeser/coercive-regulation-and 
-the-balance-of-freedom/. 
 189. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International 
Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1844 (2002). 
 190. See Jim Snyder, Budget Includes Cap and Trade Revenues, THE HILL 
(Feb. 26, 2009), http://thehill.com/homenews/news/18465-budget-includes-cap 
-and-trade-revenues. 
 191. See generally Wayne B. Gray & John T. Scholz, Does Regulatory En-
forcement Work? A Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 27 L. & SOC. REV. 
177, 179 (1993) (discussing incentive structure of OSHA workplace-safety 
rules). 
 192. Command-and-control regulation may also shape expectations, of 
course, if necessarily with a heavier hand. In relevant circumstances, however, 
it does for reasons beyond its coerciveness. 
 193. See SCHELLING, supra note 133, at 57–58. 
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locations—be it Grand Central Station or the Empire State 
Building—could offer a solution.194 Given its “salience,”195 some 
location could be expected to stand out. 
Drawing on notions of salience and of a “norm seeding” 
function for government in facilitating the emergence of effi-
cient social norms,196 I have previously described a noncoercive 
“cueing” role for state authorities in facilitating coordination.197 
Given the relative salience of public initiatives in a coordina-
tion setting, such cues might play an influential role in foster-
ing coordination around a particular norm or in displacing an 
inefficient status quo norm.198 
In the recent financial crisis, the structuring of public in-
vestment in troubled banks and other financial institutions 
with a clear signal of expected returns might be suggestive of 
such a noncoercive, cueing approach. By signaling a strong ex-
pectation of positive returns, such intervention might help to 
foster analogous expectations in the market more generally. In-
formation dissemination might play a similar role by highlight-
ing the low price-earnings ratios or sound fundamentals of cer-
tain industries. The Treasury Department’s facilitation of 
recurrent engagement among leading banks early in the crisis 
might also be seen in this light.199  
Targeting assistance to certain lenders and investors, 
whose return to the markets might be expected to hold relative-
ly greater salience, likewise suggests the power of non-coercive 
interventions in shaping expectations. The reengagement of 
such institutions in the markets might influence the expecta-
tions of banks, hedge funds, and private-equity firms more gen-
erally. A mandate that banks in receipt of public assistance in-
crease lending, by contrast, might not accomplish much—
notwithstanding all the attention that possibility received 
 
 194. See id. 
 195. See ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND 
WELFARE 89–90 (1986). 
 196. See Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative 
Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 1284–85 (1997). 
 197. See Ahdieh, supra note 38, at 223–25. 
 198. See id. at 259–61. Examples might include the issuance of reports, the 
convening of conferences, and the use of the government’s purchasing power. 
In the distinct task of displacing an existing, but inefficient, focal point, 
another tool might be the development of menus of choices, by which the sa-
lience of the status quo equilibrium might be diminished. 
 199. See Jane Sasseen & Theo Francis, Paulson Buys Up the Banks, BUS. 
WK., Oct. 13, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/election/2008/blog/archives/ 
2008/10/paulson_buys_up.html. 
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amidst the recent crisis.200 Expectations of continued lending 
and investment seem unlikely to be altered by short-term man-
dates to do so. 
The potential impact of noncoercive interventions in coor-
dination settings, however, is a double-edged sword. Command-
and-control regulation, and prescriptive regulation more gener-
ally, may not be necessary where coordination is the relevant 
goal. But the flip side of the coin is equally important to em-
phasize. In coordination settings, state interventions we might 
not ordinarily have conceived of as regulation—let alone as 
candidates for judicial review—may become so. 
Consider the government’s generation of white papers on 
various aspects of Internet regulation,201 its facilitation of 
HDTV standard setting by way of the Advisory Committee on 
Advanced Television Service,202 and its convening of represent-
atives of the major Wall Street banks early in the financial cri-
sis.203 In each of these cases, the government issued no public 
mandate and imposed no rules. In a sense, there was no “com-
mand” or “control” at all. 
Given as much, one might plausibly resist terming such in-
terventions “regulation.” Rather, they represent state action of 
some indeterminate—and implicitly inconsequential—variety. 
If such interventions have the power to generate focal points in 
coordination settings, however, they may be no less consequen-
tial than coercive regulation in their impact on private behav-
ior.204 If so, our conception of what constitutes regulation, and 
perhaps what we should review as such under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, may require modification.205 
 
 200. See David Enrich, Lending Drops at Big U.S. Banks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
26, 2009, at A1 (suggesting that the decline in lending “raises fresh questions 
about TARP’s effectiveness at coaxing banks to reopen their lending spigots”). 
 201. See, e.g., Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Inter-
net over Wireline Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R 14,986 (2005). 
 202. See Ahdieh, supra note 38, at 251–52. 
 203. See Deborah Solomon et al., Ultimatum by Paulson Sparked Frantic 
End, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at A1. 
 204. See McAdams, supra note 146, at 1712 (describing law’s effect on be-
havior not simply as a product of legal sanctions, but from its impact on the 
environment in which people interact). 
 205. This highlights a further point. That noncoercive state behavior may 
have a focal point or coordinative effect tells us nothing about the efficiency of 
that result. The government may not be particularly good at selecting among 
alternative coordination points. It may also not be especially timely in doing 
so. It is for this reason that recognition of the coordinative function of regula-
tion may counsel a broader conception of reviewable state action. 
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This, in turn, highlights a further extension in the poten-
tial scope of regulation in coordination settings. If coordination-
driven state interventions involve no necessary coercion, then 
the state’s monopoly on force ceases to be a distinguishing char-
acteristic in defining what falls within the universe of regula-
tion.206 Even relevant private action might exhibit something in 
the nature of a “regulatory” effect. If the essential impact of in-
terventions in coordination settings lies in their focal power, 
certain private actors, given their market power or history as 
prescient first movers, may possess a coordinative power no 
less than that of public authorities. 
Schelling’s theory suggests, for example, the potential for 
the New York Times to generate a relevant focal point in the 
Meeting Place game. For friends separated in New York, the 
appearance of the Empire State Building on the front page of 
the Times might lead each to expect the other to go there.207 
Similarly, a bystander with no official authority might assume 
significant power to direct traffic in a gridlocked intersection, if 
the traffic lights should fail and no other, more official means of 
coordination presents itself.208 At least in some coordination 
settings, it may consequently be important to acknowledge, and 
even review, certain kinds of private regulation as well. 
2. Information as Regulation 
The shift from incentives to expectations as the locus of 
regulatory design also highlights the critical importance of in-
formation in coordination settings. Dynamics of coordination in 
the financial markets, on the Internet, in technological innova-
tion, and in standard setting are intertwined with issues of in-
formation and knowledge.209 As such, developments in these 
areas have been so closely tied to discussions of the emerging 
“knowledge-based economy” and the “information economy” 
more generally.210 
 
 206. See Clifford Shearing, Reflections on the Refusal to Acknowledge Pri-
vate Governments, in DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF 
SECURITY 11, 20–23 (Jennifer Wood & Benoît Dupont eds., 2006) (explaining 
that a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force is a key conceptual 
component of sovereignty). 
 207. See SCHELLING, supra note 133, at 56. 
 208. See id. at 144. 
 209. See Hal R. Varian, The Information Economy: How Much Will Two 
Bits Be Worth In the Digital Marketplace?, SCI. AM., Sept. 1995, at 200–01. 
 210. See, e.g., id. See generally Information Economy Project at George Ma-
son University School of Law, GEO. MASON. U., http://www.iep.gmu.edu (last 
  
2010] THE VISIBLE HAND 623 
 
An emphasis on information is not synonymous with coor-
dination games’ emphasis on expectations. Expectations are 
shaped by a variety of factors, some informational and know-
ledge-based and others more amorphous and less rational in 
nature.211 It is minimally clear, however, that information is a 
critical influence in the shaping of expectations. 
Consider the dynamic at work in standard-setting. Other 
than where standards are dictated by law, the emergence of 
new standards depends on some pattern of coordination among 
relevant market participants.212 Sometimes, this dynamic will 
be driven by market power. A big enough player may essential-
ly dictate the standard that emerges.213 Even in these settings, 
information about the prevalence of alternative standards, 
their strengths and limitations, and their relative interopera-
bility is likely to remain the lingua franca of the standard-
setting process.214 In the absence of market power, the impor-
tance of such information is even clearer.215 In shaping partici-
pants’ expectations of the likely outcome of the coordination 
game at work, information about these and other questions can 
be expected to play a significant role. 
An important function for regulatory authorities in coordi-
nation settings consequently lies in soliciting, generating, com-
piling, and distributing technical and market information.216 In 
various high-tech areas, the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), the Federal Communications Commis-
 
visited Sept. 22, 2010) (studying the interaction of law and economics on the 
information economy). 
 211. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 31, at 404 (“[A] bank run in our 
model is caused by a shift in expectations, which could depend on almost any-
thing, consistent with the apparently irrational observed behavior of people 
running on banks.”); Masson, supra note 36, at 4; T. C. Schelling, For the Aban-
donment of Symmetry in Game Theory, 41 REV. ECON. & STAT. 213, 220–21 (1959). 
 212. See David Singer & Alexandra Guisinger, Explaining De Jure Versus 
De Facto Exchange Rate Regime Choices, Mar. 26, 2008 (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author) (paper presented at the 49th annual meeting of 
International Studies Association in 2008). 
 213. See infra notes 246–52 and accompanying text. 
 214. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Net-
work Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 491–92 (explaining that the in-
creased utility of a large number of users on an operating system will promote 
migrations to that system, both in terms of users and available applications). 
 215. See id. at 502. 
 216. See Dale A. Osterle, Regulation NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded Its Con-
gressional Mandate to Facilitate a “National Market System” in Securities 
Trading?, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 613, 619 (2005) (describing the SEC’s goal to 
design a nationwide system to make market information universally available). 
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sion, and other government agencies have played an important 
role in generating information and facilitating its exchange.217 
In overcoming the prolonged delay in the commercialization of 
HDTV technology, for example, the government-established 
Advisory Committee on Advanced Television Service played a 
central role.218 
Similar patterns might be observed in the financial mar-
kets. There, information is the coin of the realm, as evident in 
elaborate securities disclosure regimes that recognize the po-
tential need for regulation to sometimes encourage private pro-
duction of accurate information in coordination settings.219 The 
very structure of the markets, more broadly, is designed to offer 
an effective means of informational efficiency.220 Regulatory in-
itiatives designed to increase the ease of trading across ex-
changes, including long-standing aspirations to a National 
Market System and related requirements of best execution, can 
be understood in this light.221 In each case, relevant rules en-
courage the exchange of information conducive to efficient 
coordination. 
One can thus expect a regulatory regime oriented to dy-
namics of coordination in the modern economy to serve impor-
tant functions in generating, forcing, filtering, and disseminat-
ing information. In this account, the NIST, usually considered a 
backwater of the modern administrative state, potentially 
emerges as a central player.222 The production of white papers, 
 
 217. See Ahdieh, supra note 38, at 251–52. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See Joseph Grundfest & Alan L. Beller, Reinventing the Securities 
Disclosure Regime: Online Questionnaires as Substitutes for Form-Based Fil-
ings 3–4 (Stanford Univ. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 361, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1235082&. 
 220. See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: 
Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 231, 256 (2008) (“[T]he informational efficiency of public company share 
prices provides an important management tool—a company receives virtually 
instant feedback through prices and periodic feedback through analyst reports, 
concerning its strategy and performance and that of its competitors . . . .”). 
 221. See Osterle, supra note 216, at 619–23 (2005); Junius W. Peake, En-
tropy and the National Market System, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 301, 
303–04 (2007). 
 222. The National Institute of Standards and Technology describes itself as 
a “non-regulatory” federal agency within the Department of Commerce. See 
NIST General Information, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., http://www.nist 
.gov/public_affairs/general_information.cfm (last modified Oct. 5, 2010). Its 
mission is to promote innovation by advancing “measurement science, stand-
ards, and technology.” Id. 
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reports, and standards by the NIST and similar agencies takes 
on great significance in a coordination-driven account of the 
functions of the regulatory state. The imposition of reporting 
requirements by agencies including the Food and Drug Admin-
istration, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Federal 
Communications Commission is to similar effect.223 
Where coordination dynamics are the source of relevant 
demands on the administrative state, information initiatives 
become critically important. In the shaping of expectations, in-
formation will often be essential. It thus constitutes a central 
feature, not a mere appendage, of the modern regulatory 
project. 
3. The Behavioral Dimensions of Coordination 
The role of information in coordination settings highlights 
an important caveat in the regulatory implications of an in-
creased focus on expectations, rather than incentives, as the 
target of state intervention. Recent years have seen a growing 
body of work in the field of behavioral law and economics.224 
Much of this work may soon find application in administrative 
law and regulation, with the Obama Administration having 
charged Cass Sunstein with overseeing administrative rule-
making.225 The coordination dynamics emphasized herein, 
however, counsel caution in the overly quick embrace of the be-
havioral remedies that Sunstein and others have pressed.226 
Over the last twenty years, psychologists and experimental 
economists have collected significant evidence that the ration-
ality assumption of neoclassical economics fares poorly in the 
real world. Experimental analysis has highlighted significant 
cognitive failures, both in information processing (e.g., hind-
 
 223. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 812.20–.27 (2010) (requiring applications for the 
use of a significant risk device in investigations to supply a complete record of 
prior investigations). 
 224. See, e.g., Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Matching Probabilities: The Be-
havioral Law and Economics of Repeated Behavior, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 
1197–200 (2005); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473–76 (1998); Tanina Rostain, Educating 
Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and Eco-
nomics Movement, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 973, 973–76 (2000). 
 225. Brian C. Mooney, Harvard’s Sunstein to Oversee Regulation, BOS. 
GLOBE, Jan. 9, 2009, at 12, available at 2009 WLNR 435653. 
 226. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 101, at 6 (discussing the oppor-
tunities and duties presented to “choice architects”). 
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sight and availability biases) and in valuation (e.g., the en-
dowment effect).227 
In the face of these results, scholars of regulation have be-
gun to identify techniques by which regulation might alleviate, 
work around, or even take advantage of such biases.228 Build-
ing on this literature, Sunstein and Richard Thaler have ar-
gued that government authorities should take advantage of 
consistent cognitive biases and failures to encourage better in-
dividual decisionmaking.229 The use of more optimal default 
rules, the more visible display of healthy goods, and other simi-
lar adjustments in what they term our “choice architecture” are 
offered as valuable “nudges” in individual decisionmaking.230 
Although Thaler and Sunstein do not explicitly engage 
with the dynamics of coordination, their ultimate prescription 
of “nudges” can obviously be seen to echo the account of non-
coercive regulation outlined herein. Like my regulatory cues 
and Randy Picker’s “norm seeding,”231 nudges represent a 
means of substantial, and potentially determinative, regulatory 
influence, yet with no dimension of coercion. 
But a deeper point of intersection between the behavioral 
law and economics literature and the paradigm of coordination-
driven regulation explored in this Article should also be hig-
hlighted. Within traditional, defection-oriented accounts of the 
social and economic demands on the regulatory state, the cogni-
tive failures identified by behavioral psychology and economics 
constitute barriers to efficient results.232 Broadly, it is my fail-
ure to appreciate the losses I will suffer by dint of defection 
that generates the relevant dilemma. 
At least in some coordination settings, however, such fail-
ures of rationality hold the key to efficient outcomes. As Thom-
as Schelling has emphasized, the solution to coordination 
games will often be more in the nature of art than science.233 
 
 227. Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
279, 283–88 (2001). Contra Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange 
Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory 
and Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449–50 (2007). 
 228. For a discussion of how to use cognitive failures and biases to facili-
tate certain outcomes in tort, see Jolls et al., supra note 224, at 523–32. 
 229. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 101, at 6. 
 230. See id. at 3–4. 
 231. Picker, supra note 196, at 1228. 
 232. See Rostain, supra note 224, at 990–95. 
 233. SCHELLING, supra note 133, at 54–55; see also Diamond & Dybvig, 
supra note 31, at 404 (noting that any irrationality can potentially shift the 
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Rational decisionmaking does not dictate any given solution to 
coordination dilemmas. A wife in search of her husband in a 
department store might look for him at the “Lost and Found” 
desk,234 while friends separated in New York might go the Em-
pire State Building, whether because a picture of it appears in 
that day’s New York Times,235 or simply because it is the tallest 
building in town. Such decisionmaking is not rational, at least 
in any coherent sense of the word. Yet in avoiding coordination 
failures, it works. 
The optimal regulatory approach to cognitive biases, as a 
result, may not be as obvious as some of the behavioral litera-
ture would suggest. At least in coordination settings, such bi-
ases have a valuable role to play. Sunstein and others might 
therefore do well to be cautious in seeking to regulate around, 
or otherwise eliminate, our biases. 
B. FROM DOMINANT STRATEGIES TO MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA 
Echoing the shift in emphasis from incentives to expecta-
tions is the related move from dominant to interdependent 
strategies in coordination settings.236 The critical impetus for 
regulatory intervention in Prisoner’s Dilemma settings is the 
presence of a dominant strategy. Each player is incentivized to 
defect, regardless of the behavior of their counterpart.237 In 
coordination settings, by contrast, the need for intervention 
arises from the presence of multiple equilibria.238 In coordina-
tion games, there is more than one combination of strategies 
from which neither party is incentivized to shift, absent a par-
allel shift by the other.239 
 
expectations and drive a bank run); Masson, supra note 36, at 4 (describing 
the notion of “sunspots” in economics as “irrelevant variables that neverthe-
less coordinate investors’ expectations”). Such irrationality is understandably 
problematic for scientific analysis, formal modeling, and the like. Masson, su-
pra note 36, at 4. Nonetheless, that irrationality may be critically relevant for 
effective coordination. 
 234. See SCHELLING, supra note 133, at 54, 57. 
 235. See id. at 57. 
 236. See Crawford & Haller, supra note 132, at 572. See generally DIXIT & 
SKEATH, supra note 110, at 233–60 (discussing some counterintuitive results 
in games with mixed-strategy equilibria).  
 237. See POUNDSTONE, supra note 18, at 103–05. 
 238. Crawford & Haller, supra note 132, at 572. 
 239. As emphasized above, this multiple equilibrium dynamic does not dis-
appear in the presence of conflict. See supra Part II.C. Here, the infamous 
game of Chicken is starkly suggestive. Surely I prefer to win by not swerving, 
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The subsections that follow highlight implications of the 
multiple-equilibria dynamic at work in coordination settings. 
To begin, I elaborate on two points already noted above—the 
potential for coordination failure and the growing range of ac-
tions we might see as regulatory in nature. In doing so, I sug-
gest how each turns on the presence of multiple equilibria.240 I 
then consider the intersections of the coordination account I of-
fer herein with dynamics of innovation. Finally, I suggest a role 
for regulatory coordination even in Prisoner’s Dilemma set-
tings, where the relevant game repeats. Each of these roles, we 
will see, likewise turn on the presence of multiple equilibria. 
1. Multiple Equilibria, Barriers to Entry, and Lock-in in 
Coordination 
Rather than simply a bit of arcane math, the shift from 
dominant strategies to multiple equilibria emphasizes the dis-
tinct regulatory project at work in coordination settings. In the 
face of collective-action problems, externalities, and other fa-
miliar arguments for regulation, relevant interventions seek to 
alter a dominant strategy of defection.241 No issue of defection 
arises in coordination settings, by contrast, given that no player 
can gain by abandoning the prevailing coordination point. This 
is the pattern behind the stickiness of dominant standards, 
whether in high-tech industries or elsewhere.242 It likewise ex-
plains the tendency toward strongly dominant networks.243 As 
these examples suggest, however, the presence of multiple 
equilibria raises its own issues. As outlined above, it generates 
distinct challenges to achieving and maintaining efficiency, 
both at the front and back end of the coordination process. 
 
when my opponent does so. I strongly prefer to lose by swerving, however, when 
my opponent does not swerve. Bluntly put, losing is Pareto superior to dying. 
 240. For an example of the growing range of actions we might consider 
regulatory, see supra Part III.A.2. For an example of a potential coordination 
failure, consider the choice of whether to meet at Grand Central or Penn Cen-
tral. Supra Part II.B. 
 241. Cf. Wiley, supra note 127, at 1916–18 (explaining that the punish-
ments imposed by antitrust statutes will effectively prevent all collusion in a 
finitely repeated duopoly situation). 
 242. See Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Pat-
ented Standards, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009). 
 243. See James J. Angel, Consolidation in the Global Equity Market: A His-
torical Perspective (Feb. 25, 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with au-
thor). 
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At the front-end, multiple equilibria create potential bar-
riers to entry.244 Fear-of-coordination failures of one sort or 
another may lead relevant actors to resist, or at least delay, en-
try. Given the potential for non-coordination, or coordination 
around a suboptimal equilibrium, players may remain on the 
sidelines for fear of making the wrong choice.245 
This is especially true when one considers the presence of 
“tipping effects” in the network and standard-setting areas in 
which coordination will often be the focus.246 Network external-
ities—paradigmatically captured by the telephone and fax ma-
chine—arise in the face of demand-side economies of scale.247 
Here, the utility of a certain technology—a particular currency, 
a choice of language, a preferred securities exchange, one DVD 
standard versus another, or simply the telephone—depends on 
the size of its network of users.248 
Given this dynamic, coordination-oriented industries are 
prone to “tip” to a dominant standard or network.249 If the 
“network value” of a relevant good significantly outweighs its 
“inherent value,” users can be expected to move fairly abruptly 
to a dominant network, once someone suggests its likely dom-
inance.250 The dramatic success of the VHS standard over the 
 
 244. Given that “the inability of agents to coordinate their actions success-
fully in a many-person, decentralized economy” can prevent entry into the la-
bor market, Cooper and John highlight the potential for underemployment 
equilibria. Cooper & John, supra note 36, at 442; see also id. at 451 (“Due to 
coordination failures, the economy can get stuck at a low level of output.”). 
 245. This result assumes, importantly, the presence of some meaningful 
cost associated with changing from the initial choice. 
 246. See Ahdieh, supra note 38, at 226–28 (discussing how tipping effects 
may cause network competition to become inefficient); cf. Geoffrey Heal & 
Howard Kunreuther, Supermodularity and Tipping (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. W12281, 2006). 
 247. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network 
Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 535 (1998). 
 248. See id. at 483; Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Di-
vestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5, 59 (2001); see also Mi-
chael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 
VA. L. REV. 757, 772 (1995) (noting that some products become more valuable 
as their use becomes more common, and these products confer benefits to oth-
er users, creating a network externality). 
 249. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 250. See Ahdieh, supra note 38, at 291–92 (“[W]here the proportion of net-
work value to inherent value in a particular good or service . . . is relatively 
low, the benefits of the inherent traits of a given good may outweigh the net-
work benefits of its larger competitor, at least for certain users.”). 
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Betamax alternative has commonly been cited by way of exam-
ple.251 
In the face of such tipping effects, two patterns of barrier to 
entry may arise in coordination settings. First, no player may 
enter, because of the challenge of accurately predicting which 
among several potential coordination equilibria will emerge. 
This, again, is the story of the extended delay in the commer-
cialization of HDTV technology.252 This form of barrier to entry 
is aggravated, moreover, by the relative inability to recoup 
sunk costs in the presence of strong network or coordination ef-
fects. If the preference for coordination in a given setting is suf-
ficiently strong, the limited utility of a non-dominant standard 
or network may prevent a user or producer of it from making 
sales, even at well below their marginal cost.253 
A second, more likely form of barrier to entry is the possi-
bility of little entry beyond a first mover. In the presence of tip-
ping effects, we can expect to see strong first-mover advantag-
es.254 There may consequently be little barrier to entry by the 
initial entrant. Thereafter, however, the potential for entry 
may be dramatically diminished. The seeming persistence of 
certain technical standards, notwithstanding their dated quali-
ty, may be suggestive of this pattern.255 In such cases, a first 
mover may secure sufficient advantage to disincentivize com-
petitive entry. 
If barriers to entry constitute a potential market failure at 
the front end in coordination settings, a further source of ineffi-
ciency may present itself at the back end. Whether the equili-
brium that emerges at the outset is Pareto superior or inferior, 
 
 251. See, e.g., JAGDISH SHETH & RAJENDRA SISODIA, THE RULE OF THREE: 
SURVIVING AND THRIVING IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS 15 (2002). 
 252. See Ellen P. Goodman, Digital Television and the Allure of Auctions: 
The Birth and Stillbirth of DTV Legislation, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 517, 522–25 
(1997) (discussing the FCC’s restriction on DTV access as a means of “en-
sur[ing] that broadcast television remained a viable option for those who could 
not or would not pay for subscription video services”). 
 253. See Ahdieh, supra note 38, at 227 n.45. 
 254. See William E. Cohen, Competition and Foreclosure in the Context of 
Installed Base and Compatibility Effects, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 550 (1996) 
(“Adoption of a competitive compatibility standard can yield important net-
work effects. It essentially gives consumers the benefit of other suppliers’ net-
works.”); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 247, at 531, 541 (discussing how 
“courts have considered network effects in deciding whether or not to grant a 
new or stronger form of intellectual property protection to the standard setter” 
and using Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, 516 U.S. 233 
(1996), as an example of the courts’ preference for first movers). 
 255. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
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it is likely to be quite sticky. Even where various changes and 
advances counsel adjustment or displacement of a prevailing 
coordination equilibrium, the status quo may persist. No as-
surance can consequently be offered of ongoing efficiency in 
coordination settings. “[M]utual gains from an all-around 
change in strategies may not be realized because no individual 
player has an incentive to deviate from the initial equili-
brium.”256 
2. Cues, Seeds, and Nudges: The Changing Nature of Modern 
Regulation 
As with the shift from incentives to expectations, the shift 
from dominant strategies to multiple equilibria similarly high-
lights the importance of information. In overcoming barriers to 
entry and lock-in effects, information directed toward the utili-
ty and market share of potential alternatives, the preferences 
of salient users, and questions of compatibility and interopera-
bility may be critical to efficient entry and adjustment. 
An emphasis on barriers to entry and lock-in also sheds 
light on the role of regulation as a signaling device in coordina-
tion settings. In these circumstances, regulatory cues, norm 
seeding, or nudges may play an essential role in facilitating 
more efficient patterns of entry and exit.257 By shaping relevant 
expectations, such cues may effectively overcome barriers to 
entry and lock-in effects. Among other means, this may be 
achieved by the dissemination of relevant data and research, 
the organization of conferences directed to particular coordina-
tion questions, advice giving,258 and the use of the government’s 
purchasing power. Such measures may, in essence, reduce un-
certainty in choosing among multiple coordination equilibria. 
If cueing, seeding, and nudging functions are important 
means of overcoming barriers to entry and lock-in in coordina-
tion settings, some adjustment in our conceptions of the scope 
of relevant regulation may be needed. I have already discussed 
the potential role of private actors in facilitating coordination, 
as well as the need to recognize some incidents of noncoercive 
 
 256. Cooper & John, supra note 36, at 442–43. 
 257. See supra text accompanying notes 196–98, 226–34. 
 258. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1709, 1715–20 (1998), construed in Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and 
Decree: International Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2076 
(2004). For a discussion of judicial advice-giving as an alternative to judicial 
review, see Ahdieh supra. 
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public action as state action of a sort.259 A particular category of 
the latter, perhaps especially relevant in overcoming barriers to 
entry and lock-in, arises where the state functions as a market 
participant. In our constitutional jurisprudence, we have care-
fully parsed these occasions out of the universe of state ac-
tion.260 In these circumstances, the argument goes, the gov-
ernment may be bigger than others, but it is no different in 
kind. 
One might even expect mere participation in the market to 
impact expectations in coordination settings. Consider a compe-
tition between competing products—the choice between Lexis 
and Westlaw online legal databases, for example. Given its rel-
ative salience, the decision of the government to favor one 
standard—in this case, the decision of the U.S. Department of 
Justice to purchase only Westlaw access—might significantly 
impact private expectations of the standard likely to prevail in 
the end.261 
Government procurement decisions might thus go a long 
way in addressing potential barriers to entry and lock-in effects 
in coordination settings. Where some efficient technology is un-
derutilized, for example, public adoption of it might dramatical-
ly alter expectations of its potential success. Conversely, if that 
technology should come to exhibit a degree of lock-in, prevent-
ing the emergence of superior alternatives, public procurement 
of those alternatives might help to diminish the focal power of 
the still dominant, but dated, technology. 
Both where salient private actors generate signals with 
focal power, and where public authorities function as market 
participants, it may be necessary to assess the dynamic at work 
as a species of regulation. Noncoercive as such conduct might 
be, its impact in coordination settings may warrant a role for 
procedural and adjudicatory constraint. Even on the public 
side, this would be a notable shift, by which heretofore non-
actionable state action would become subject to review. In the 
 
 259. See supra notes 204–08 and accompanying text. 
 260. See, e.g., White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 
206–08 (1983) (construing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436–39 (1980), 
and Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976)) (“[W]hen a 
state or local government enters the market as a participant it is not subject to 
the restraints of the Commerce Clause.”). 
 261. Cf. Paul Norman, The Big Match–Lexis v. Westlaw, 4 LEGAL INFO. 
MGMT. 90, 96 (2004) (asking if the United Kingdom can safely ditch Lexis and 
rely solely on Westlaw, but concluding that although Lexis has a larger case 
archive, it suffers from the absence of a sophisticated indexing system). 
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private setting, the result is even more striking. What might be 
the criteria to determine when private action rises to the level 
of “regulation”? Problematic as it might be, could we imagine 
the imposition of procedural constraints akin to those of the 
Administrative Procedure Act on such private action? Whatev-
er prudence might ultimately counsel in our response to these 
possibilities, the analysis herein highlights the need to more 
carefully assess the scope of cognizable regulation. 
3. Regulation and Coordination in Innovation 
If multiple-equilibria-driven barriers to entry and lock-in 
displace dominant-strategy-driven defection as the impetus for 
regulation in coordination settings, it is worth considering the 
implications for issues of innovation. I have already empha-
sized the general coordination dynamic at work in innovation 
today. Given both the explosion in patent registrations and the 
nature of innovation finance, coordination-driven regulation 
must necessarily be at the center of the process.262 But a broad-
er nexus of innovation and the coordination functions of regula-
tion might also be suggested. In coordination settings, we argu-
ably face just the opposite concern as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
settings traditionally emphasized in our analysis of regulation. 
In the latter circumstances, regulation seeks to respond to pat-
terns of excess defection. Suboptimal entry and lock-in of pre-
vailing equilibria, by contrast, might be cast as cases of inade-
quate defection. In these circumstances, the aim of relevant 
regulation is to overcome inertia—in a sense, to encourage de-
fection. 
An important facet of coordination-driven regimes of regu-
lation might thus be the encouragement of innovation.263 Ex-
amples might include the financing of basic research and de-
velopment, the encouragement of relevant linkages and 
partnerships, the underwriting of patent processes, and the de-
velopment of common standards, among others.264 Whatever 
 
 262. See supra text accompanying notes 61–64. 
 263. See generally Ronald Hirshhorn et al., Innovation in a Knowledge-
Based Economy: The Role of Government, in PRODUCTIVITY ISSUES IN CANADA 
789, 789–832 (Someshwar Rao & Andrew Sharpe eds., 2002). 
 264. In encouraging the movement away from a dominant practice or norm, 
one might also imagine an important role for menus generated by public au-
thorities. Cf. Klausner, supra note 248, at 839–41 (noting that corporate law 
can create menus to promote coordination in network externalities). Such menus 
of options or alternatives might be expected to help diminish the salience of 
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form it might take, such facilitation and encouragement of in-
novation may constitute an important aspect of the regulatory 
regime when our focus is on multiple equilibria rather than 
dominant strategies. 
4. Regulatory Coordination and the Evolution of Cooperation 
As widely noted in the legal literature, evolutionary game 
theory has suggested the potential for cooperation to emerge 
out of indefinite iterations of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.265 With 
repetition, as Robert Axelrod highlighted, a cooperative strate-
gy of non-defection emerges as a sub-game perfect Nash equili-
brium.266 This equilibrium is not dominant, given that mutual 
defection and various mixed strategies are potential equilibria 
as well.267 
Where Prisoner’s Dilemma settings are characterized by 
the potential for recurrent engagement over some indetermi-
nate period of time, then, we find precisely the multiple equili-
bria of a coordination game. The Prisoner’s Dilemma, in es-
sence, becomes a coordination game.268 This suggests important 
extensions of the account of coordination-driven regulation of-
fered herein. To begin, regulatory coordination may have appli-
cation not only in the coordination settings highlighted in Part 
I, but in any setting in which a Prisoner’s Dilemma might be 
 
the dominant standard, which would presumably be included in any menu, 
but only as one among numerous potential options. 
 265. Robert Axelrod famously posited the potential for the “evolution of co-
operation” in repeat play Prisoner’s Dilemma games. See ROBERT AXELROD, 
THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7–14 (1984) [hereinafter AXELROD, 
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION]; Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation 
Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 306, 307 (1981) (discussing the appro-
priate conditions for cooperation to emerge); Robert Axelrod & William D. 
Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCIENCE 1390, 1391–93 (1981); 
Michael Trebilcock & Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and Development: The 
Contingent Case for Formalization, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397, 412–13 (2008) 
(discussing Axelrod’s game theory approach and how “mutually beneficial co-
operative outcomes can arise in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma”). 
 266. See AXELROD, EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION, supra note 265, at 10–11 
(“[W]ith an indefinite number of interactions, cooperation can emerge.”). 
 267. See id. at 45–46 (discussing various strategies that may lead to coop-
eration); CHONG, supra note 179, at 39–42 (describing the strategy of mutual 
defection working itself into a pattern of cooperation). 
 268. See, e.g., Amnon Rapoport et al., An Experimental Study of Coordina-
tion and Learning in Iterated Two-Market Entry Games, 16 ECON. THEORY 
661, 685 (2000) (pointing to Nash equilibrium as an explanation for tacit coor-
dination in multi-member iterated games). 
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subject to repeat plays.269 Where collective-action problems or 
externalities arise in iterative settings, regulation that is non-
coercive, information-oriented, and in the nature of cues and 
nudges may have relevant application. 
Consider the prospect of free-riding in the generation of so-
cially useful scientific research—a self-evident public good. In 
an indefinite repeat-play setting, the incentive of any given cit-
izen to withhold support is diminished by an awareness that 
others will defect thereafter, depriving all of the relevant bene-
fits. Non-defection—here, support for relevant research—
consequently emerges as a potential equilibrium. In the actual 
selection of this preferable equilibrium over the alternative of 
mutual defection, however, noncoercive, information-oriented 
regulatory cues may have a role to play. As in the more conven-
tional coordination settings outlined above, such coordinative 
regulation might contribute significantly to shaping expecta-
tions of the likely emergence of the Pareto optimal equilibrium 
of well-funded scientific research.270 
Yet such an embrace of heightened emphasis on coordina-
tion suggests an even broader point about relevant regulatory 
regimes. If Prisoner’s Dilemmas become more tractable coordi-
nation games when played repeatedly, one might consider a po-
tential role for regulation in encouraging repeat plays in oth-
erwise single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma settings. Regulatory 
measures designed to encourage repeat interaction might thus 
be folded into the patterns of a new regulation suggested here-
in. Tax incentives for joint ventures, code sharing among air-
lines, and other means of fostering intertwined business rela-
tions might thus warrant our attention.271 Information 
generation and dissemination may also play a role. By ensuring 
the availability of complete information as to the participation 
 
 269. This is likewise true where repetition is not indefinite, but there is 
some operative uncertainty as to the timing of any final play. 
 270. McAdams, relying on the work of Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Wein-
gast, points out a further dynamic of coordination that may emerge with the 
iteration of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game: the choice among alternative policy 
equilibria around which the parties might coordinate. See McAdams, supra 
note 18, at 228–29. 
 271. Such tax incentives, of course, fall outside the regulatory paradigm of 
noncoercive regulation that is not directed to incentives, but to expectations. 
See supra Part III.A.1. Yet this makes perfect sense. In encouraging the itera-
tion of otherwise single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games, the dynamic at work 
at the outset is not one of coordination. A multiple-equilibria coordination 
game only arises once the game has been rendered iterative in nature. 
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versus nonparticipation of individual players, regulatory au-
thorities might strengthen the repeat-play dynamic at work.272 
Even in the face of familiar Prisoner’s Dilemma dynamics 
in modern social and economic life, then, patterns of coordina-
tion-driven regulation may have an increasingly important role 
to play.273 Conventionally, our regulatory response to such set-
tings has been to alter individual incentives to defect, through 
various coercive measures. When we appreciate the potential 
transmutation of Prisoner’s Dilemmas into coordination games 
through repeat play, a quite distinct regulatory project is sug-
gested. By facilitating repeat interactions and complete infor-
mation, regulators may help to facilitate spontaneous order.274 
At a minimum, such initial interventions may render noncoer-
cive, information-oriented regulatory cues more capable of facil-
itating efficient results. 
Going a step further, one might move beyond a working as-
sumption of fixed payoffs, and a resulting focus on regulation 
within a game, to consider the role of regulation in changing 
the game that is being played. Again, John Maynard Smith’s 
evolutionary biology framing of a skulling (Prisoner’s Dilemma) 
versus rowing (coordination) game275 is helpful in suggesting 
the fine distinctions between relevant game structures—
distinctions that regulation might readily insinuate. Here, to be 
 
 272. It is worth emphasizing, with regard to these and similarly motivated 
interventions, that the critical mechanism by which cooperation emerges in 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma is not repetition generally, but repetition that is indef-
inite or, alternatively, where the timing of any final play is uncertain. Beyond 
encouraging repeat plays generally, therefore, one might speculate about ways 
in which a coordination-minded regulatory regime might foster uncertainty as 
to when ongoing relationships might terminate. Here, competing values are 
necessarily at stake. Recalling the centrality of information in coordination 
settings, however, one might imagine a regulatory regime that dictates signifi-
cant information disclosure upfront, but limits required information sharing 
thereafter, in such a way that fosters uncertainty of a sort conducive to spon-
taneous cooperation. Cf. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization 
Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1055 
(2004) (“[T]he experimentalist lawmaker does not try to calibrate remedies 
precisely to induce the desired pattern of conduct, because she does not know 
with any specificity what the desired pattern of conduct is.”). 
 273. See McAdams, supra note 18, at 229–30 (describing why coordination 
may be a prerequisite to cooperation). 
 274. See AXELROD, EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION, supra note 265, at 155–
56 (noting that in the case of a government and its citizens, the government 
elicits compliance by “setting and enforcing the rules so that it pays for most of 
the governed to obey most of the time”). Contract law might plausibly be cast 
as helping to serve this function. 
 275. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
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sure, we are no longer talking about coordinative regulation. 
Interventions that create coordination games, on the other 
hand, are closely linked to the latter. 
C. FROM INDIVIDUALS TO GROUPS 
Finally, one might see in the move from Prisoner’s Dilem-
ma-oriented to coordination-oriented accounts of the regulatory 
state some shift in emphasis from individuals to groups. Coor-
dination game environments are both characterized and moti-
vated by collective conceptions and commitments of a sort. At 
heart, coordination dynamics are group dynamics. 
At one level, we might say the same of Prisoner’s Dilemma 
games, given their aspiration to understand individual deci-
sions in the context of the strategic choices of others. One might 
even see this as the goal of game theory, generally.276 The dom-
inant strategies that characterize the Prisoner’s Dilemma dy-
namic, however, undercut this account. In the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma, the strategy choice of any given player is independent 
of any other individual’s choice. 
In coordination settings, by contrast, each player’s choice of 
strategy is dependent on that of others. If my wife is going to a 
boxing match, so will I, unhappy as I might be about it. Simi-
larly, if you refuse to swerve in the game of Chicken, I will—
however grudgingly. More tangibly, if I could convince my col-
leagues to switch to iMacs, I would too. Until then, I continue 
to type these words on a PC. To similar effect, if Bank of Amer-
ica can get Wells Fargo to resume the extension of credit, and 
likewise if it cannot. 
In shaping regulation in coordination settings, this dynam-
ic proves important. Such regulation is about the group as 
much as the individual. It seeks to shape group expectations, 
group strategies, and ultimately group behaviors. In the stand-
ard-setting underpinning the Internet, for example, the first-
order question is common embrace of any given standard; its 
particular nature comes second. A lower-quality but shared 
standard is thus preferable to the higher-quality standard I use 
alone. 
This points to some intersection between a coordination-
driven account of regulation and the substantial body of recent 
 
 276. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, Differing Disciplinary Perspectives on 
The Origins Of Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 479, 491 (2001) (suggesting that game 
theory builds on “a premise of methodological individualism” in order to “ques-
tion how social cooperation arises”). 
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scholarship devoted to the study of social norms.277 In that body 
of work, scholars including Robert Ellickson, Lisa Bernstein, 
Richard McAdams, Eric Posner, and others have explored the 
operation of social sanctions, and expectations, in the back-
ground of, alongside, and even in conflict with formal law.278 In 
particular, they have highlighted the role of social norms in 
solving collective action problems.279  
Social norms might be understood to have particular res-
onance, however, in settings in which coordination failures are 
the issue of concern. In facilitating coordination, such norms 
can play a central role by shaping expectations. On the other 
hand, the reverse is also true. Recalling the barriers to entry 
and lock-in problems that stymie efficient coordination, social 
norms of a sort may often undergird such resistance to optimal 
coordination. One might even think of coordination equilibria 
themselves as a kind of social norm.280 
In the design of regimes of regulatory coordination, then, 
the importance of group dynamics counsels emphasis on the 
creation and displacement of social norms. Beyond Picker’s 
“norm seeding,”281 others have explored this pattern as well. 
Richard McAdams posits a focal point function for law in en-
couraging coordinated shifts in social norms.282 Bob Cooter, by 
 
 277. For classic treatments of social norms, see generally DAVID K. LEWIS, 
CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969); SUGDEN, supra note 195; EDNA 
ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977). This scholarship 
has been revisited and substantially refreshed over the past decade. See, e.g., 
CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS 
OF SOCIAL NORMS (2006); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); 
SOCIAL NORMS (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001). 
 278. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); POSNER, supra note 277; Lisa Bernstein, 
Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Dia-
mond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); McAdams, supra note 146. 
 279. See Rostain, supra note 224, at 990–91 (“If every group endeavor is 
potentially prey to a collective action difficulty, it becomes necessary to explain 
the high degree of observed cooperative behavior. To account for cooperation, 
law and economics scholarship enlists social norms, which compel people to act 
cooperatively, despite their individual self-interest.”). 
 280. See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. 
REV. 813, 819–20 (1998) (suggesting that if costs are reduced, the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma may be reconstructed as an Assurance Game “in which parties will 
be willing to move to the new equilibrium because they are confident that a 
sufficient number of others will”). 
 281. See Picker, supra note 196, at 1284–85 (describing how the govern-
ment and other entities can create a cluster that grows “until the old conven-
tion [is] overrun”). 
 282. See McAdams, supra note 146, at 1671–72. 
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contrast, offers an account in which law facilitates the internal-
ization of norms.283 For Sunstein, finally, law may foster “norm 
cascades” in which tipping effects produce quick displacement 
of a prevailing norm.284 In these and other ways, a regime of 
regulatory coordination might effectively engage social norms 
in the encouragement of efficient coordination. 
A further implication of the shift from an individual to a 
group orientation in coordination settings is a potential shift in 
the role of regulatory interventions nominally directed to indi-
viduals. Where coordination rather than defection is the impe-
tus for regulation, regulatory constraints on individuals might 
still occur yet be directed to distinctly different ends.285 In such 
settings, interventions might be less ends unto themselves than 
means to our desired goals. Where we regulate an institution’s 
use of a particular technical standard or securities trading sys-
tem, our priority may not be the incentives and resulting strat-
egy choices of that individual institution. Rather, we might ex-
pect the latter’s choices to alter expectations, along the lines 
described above. By preventing a salient player on the financial 
markets from executing block trades of a certain size on a given 
exchange, we may be less concerned with that particular insti-
tution’s choice of trading platform than with the signal its use 
of the relevant system might send to others.286 
This too might be connected back to the social norms dy-
namic discussed above. One might thus imagine command-and-
control regulation not motivated by a desire to change a given 
individual’s behavior but by a wish to reduce the salience of a 
prevailing social norm. By coercing one market participant to 
abandon a dominant social norm, its stability might be dimin-
ished. 
A further source of the more collective dynamic at work in 
coordination settings goes to the potential distributional issues 
at stake in the latter. By comparison with the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma, where interventions are ordinarily understood to gen-
erate equal utility for all parties, the choice among alternative 
coordination equilibria will often, as suggested above, favor one 
 
 283. See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
585, 586–89 (1998). 
 284. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2021, 2032–33 (1996). 
 285. See Ahdieh, supra note 38, at 282. 
 286. See id. at 279–84. 
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party over another.287 A purely individualistic analysis may 
constitute, for that reason, an incomplete window into the is-
sues at stake.288  
Most broadly, a stronger orientation to group dynamics in 
coordination settings might be seen to challenge the methodo-
logical individualism that underpins neoclassical economics 
and the law and economics derived from it.289 According to the 
latter, the operative unit of analysis in the study of economic, 
social, or political phenomena must be the individual.290 One 
must ultimately reduce the analysis of institutions from the 
state to the market to the story of individual incentive and ra-
tional choice. 
In a number of ways, such methodological individualism is 
under pressure today.291 The growing literature directed to 
network effects is suggestive. In its focus on demand-side econ-
omies of scale, the network literature essentially speaks to a 
world in which individual utility curves cannot be meaningfully 
disaggregated from social consumption of a given network good. 
The individual benefits of a telephone, fax machine, online so-
cial network, or securities exchange thus depend on its con-
sumption by others.292 To talk about the individual utility of a 
network good, as such, misses at least as much as it captures. 
 
 287. See McAdams, supra note 18, at 218–20. 
 288. Distinctly, the greater distributional problems in coordination settings 
might be seen as an argument against intervention in coordination versus 
Prisoner’s Dilemma dynamics. 
 289. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 
89 NW. U. L. REV. 4, 33 (1994); Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 
DUKE L.J. 53, 56 (1992); Robert B. Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and 
Economics 4 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). On the 
grounding of standard law and economics in neoclassical economics, see, for 
example, Jolls et al., supra note 224, at 1545, and Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Eco-
nomics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1197 (1997). 
 290. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Methodological Individualism and Social 
Knowledge, 84 AM. ECON. REV., May 1994, at 1, 1; Lars Udehn, The Changing 
Face of Methodological Individualism, 28 ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 489 (2002). 
 291. Besides the literatures outlined below—studies of network effects, the 
social nature of knowledge, social norms, and coordination games—other rele-
vant research areas might also be noted in this vein, including analyses of 
strategic complementarities and herd behavior. See Cooper & John, supra note 
36, at 442 (noting the nature of strategic complementarities, as distinct from 
spillovers, as interactions between actors at the level of strategies rather than 
merely payoffs). 
 292. See Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: 
Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1967, 1974 (M. Armstrong & R. Porter eds., 2007). 
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The growing emphasis on the place of knowledge in the so-
cial and economic order, again in relation to the changing na-
ture of modern technology, is to similar effect. Kenneth Arrow 
has emphasized the social nature of the production, possession, 
and very nature of knowledge, explicitly highlighting the chal-
lenge this raises for methodological individualism.293 “[T]he 
[role] of technical information in the economy,” he suggests, “is 
an especially significant case of an irreducibly social category in 
the explanatory apparatus of economics.”294 
The study of social norms might also be cited in this re-
gard.295 Though not quite as sharply in tension with methodo-
logical individualism as the study of network externalities and 
knowledge, here too one finds significant conflict. Social norms, 
of course, are grounded in the collective practice of some regu-
larity of behavior. Such a regularity becomes a norm, in turn, 
where it is followed with some sense of obligation. Analysis of 
the collective, as such, is critical to an understanding of social 
norms. 
The coordination-driven analysis advanced herein, finally, 
can also be included in this litany. By dint of the interdepend-
ence of strategies at the heart of coordination games, they high-
light the limits of a rigidly individualistic orientation. If collec-
tive expectations are the critical ingredient in the solution to 
coordination failures, rather than individual incentives, 
methodological individualism overlooks a critical dimension of 
the analysis. 
To be clear, none of these literatures directly undermine 
the claim of methodological individualism, since each might 
well be framed in the reductionist terms it prescribes. The 
coordination game literature, like game theory generally, is ul-
timately directed to the strategic choices of individuals.296 That 
said, when considered as a collective whole, the study of net-
work effects, the social nature of knowledge, social norms, and 
coordination games represent a meaningful challenge to the 
sufficiency of methodological individualism’s account. Individu-
 
 293. See Arrow, supra note 290, at 1 (“I want to argue today that a close 
examination of even the most standard economic analysis shows that social 
categories are in fact used in economic analysis all the time and that they ap-
pear to be absolute necessities of the analysis, not just figures of speech that 
can be eliminated if need be.”). 
 294. Id. 
 295. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective 
Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 337 n.75 (2007). 
 296. See Udehn, supra note 290, at 483. 
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als may well remain the basic unit of analysis, but in the de-
sign of effective regulatory regimes, a focus on groups may be 
critical as well. 
D. CRISIS AND COORDINATION IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
It is beyond the scope of the present analysis to play out 
the full implications of the foregoing principles of a coordina-
tion-driven regulatory regime. This is especially true given the 
dependence of any such assessment on a context-specific “mi-
croanalysis” of institutions—an analysis sensitive to the dis-
tinct dynamics of coordination at work in any particular regula-
tory setting.297 Given the salience of the recent financial crisis 
as an example of coordination dynamics in the modern social 
and economic order, however, it may be useful to conclude by 
suggesting implications of the above for our response to such 
crises. 
Most obviously, this Article emphasizes failures of coordi-
nation rather than defection to be at the heart of financial cris-
es. For all the attention lavished on executive bonuses and 
compensation,298 on Bernie Madoff299 and Allen Stanford,300 
and on the need to address the exploding rate of foreclosures,301 
none of these were at the core of the financial crisis.302 At its 
heart, rather, stood a failure of lending and investment. 
More precisely, it was a problem of multiple equilibria. As 
outlined above, financial markets are characterized by alterna-
tive potential equilibria—one defined by the extension of credit, 
by investment, and by growth, and the other by the denial of 
credit, curtailed investment, and economic contraction.303 The 
core challenge for financial market regulators is consequently 
how to avoid the shift to a suboptimal equilibrium when the 
market is healthy and, when crises nonetheless occur, how to 
 
 297. See Rubin, supra note 20, at 1425–26. 
 298. See, e.g., Andrews & Bajaj, supra note 24, at A1. 
 299. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 24, at 5. 
 300. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss et al., Fraud Parade: $8 Billion Case Is Next 
in Line, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 3130330. 
 301. See Vikas Bajaj, Responding to a Housing Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 
2008, at C1, available at 2008 WLNR 16086145. 
 302. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest these were not grave issues in 
their own right. Given its scope, the foreclosure crisis likely warrants even more 
attention than it has received. I likewise recognize the secondary impact of 
these varied market failures on credit markets. They do not speak directly to 
the financial crisis, however, and hence to the recovery of the financial markets. 
 303. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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shift the market back in the other direction. How do regulatory 
authorities displace barriers to entry in the credit and invest-
ment markets, overcoming lock-in of the suboptimal equili-
brium of noninvestment? Ultimately, this is a question of ex-
pectations: how can the Federal Reserve Bank, the U.S. 
Treasury, and even the White House shift market participants’ 
expectations of the likely lending and investment practices of 
other market participants?304 
If the resolution of financial crises lies in such an adjust-
ment of expectations and a resulting shift to the Pareto supe-
rior equilibrium of lending and investment, what policy impli-
cations follow for the State’s response to financial crises? One is 
the relatively more limited, or at least distinct, role it suggests 
for coercive regulatory interventions such as the much-debated 
possibility of mandating lending by recipients of federal bailout 
funds.305 If the operative task is to adjust the expectations of 
banks and hedge funds as to the likely lending and investment 
practices of other banks and hedge funds, such prescriptive 
regulation may have a limited place. Notwithstanding its alter-
ation of subject banks’ incentives, its impact on expectations 
more broadly seems likely to be limited. In a coordination set-
ting, however, it is primarily that indirect impact that would 
justify its imposition. 
If the critical regulatory need in the financial crisis lies in 
cues designed to shape expectations rather than in the coercive 
alteration of incentives, what might qualify as such cues or 
nudges? One example might be the bank “stress tests” con-
ducted by the U.S. Treasury in early 2009.306 As irrelevant to 
incentives as this initiative was, and as ambiguous as were the 
implications of a bank’s failure, the significant attention to the 
tests might be understood by reference to their role in shaping 
expectations. If the federal government could systematically 
 
 304. A further dimension of the government’s task to facilitate coordination 
amidst the recent financial crisis lies in the structure of the credit markets, by 
which a bank’s lending is dependent on its ability to market its securitized 
debt to hedge funds and private equity firms. See supra notes 25–40 and ac-
companying text. Some dynamic of coordination consequently exists across 
distinct categories of banking and private investment entities as well. 
 305. Again, I do not wish to suggest that such coercion does not have its 
place in addressing fraud, excessive risk taking, and analogous defections from 
efficient equilibria—or that such defections are uncommon. 
 306. See Deborah Solomon & Jon Hilsenrath, Bank Capital Gets Stress 
Test, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2009, at A3. 
  
644 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:578 
 
separate out the wheat from the chaff, perhaps investors might 
expect that they could do so as well. 
One might cite the gathering of bank representatives as 
another tool in shaping relevant expectations. Though con-
vened early in the financial crisis,307 a greater frequency of 
such gatherings may have been useful. Wider participation by 
the hedge funds and private equity firms on which banks were 
dependent for their continued lending would likewise have 
been beneficial. In coordinating relevant expectations, such 
broader gatherings may well have played a valuable role. 
Beyond these two, other regulatory cues of relevance to the 
resolution, and perhaps the avoidance, of financial crises might 
also be suggested. As evident in the financial market’s close at-
tention to Alan Greenspan’s every word during his tenure as 
chair of the Federal Reserve Bank, and to the Kremlin-esque 
minutes of the Fed’s Open Market Committee, official state-
ments on the markets have the potential to play a vital role in 
facilitating desirable coordination.308 Though cheap talk, they 
may be a significant factor in any movement between optimal 
and suboptimal equilibria. The careful use of such state-
ments—by the President, the Chair of the Federal Reserve, and 
the Secretary of the Treasury Department—may be crucial. 
Regular statistical reporting on the state of the markets 
might serve a similar function. A well-designed regime of regu-
latory coordination in the financial markets, however, would 
need to carefully consider the appropriate frequency of such re-
porting. In the shaping of expectations amidst a financial crisis, 
some data might benefit from more frequent collection and dis-
semination. Other information might better be offered with less 
regularity.309 
A final category of potential regulatory cues in financial 
crises would be efforts to increase the salience of market behav-
ior inconsistent with a prevailing equilibrium of non-lending 
 
 307. Cf. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Merrill Is Sold; Failing to Find Buyer, Lehman 
Set to File for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1 (describing vari-
ous actions taken by Wall Street firms in response to the financial crisis). 
 308. See Shares Edge Higher as Greenspan Offers Positive Outlook, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2004, at C7, available at 2004 WLNR 5599926; cf. ELLYN 
BOUKUS & JOSHUA V. ROSENBERG, THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF FOMC 
MINUTES 1–5 (2006), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/ 
economists/rosenberg/Boukus_and_Rosenberg_072006.pdf. 
 309. This need not correlate with the likelihood that some reports versus 
others will offer better news. Rather, the notion is that some types of short-
term information may be more prone to impact expectations in harmful ways. 
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and non-investment. Some banks continued to lend, even 
amidst the crisis. Some funds continued to invest. In each case, 
profits were made. By emphasizing such activity, perhaps in 
the particular, regulators may diminish the salience of the pre-
vailing equilibrium of non-lending and non-investment. In the 
best of all possible worlds, they might even re-establish lending 
and investment as a focal point for coordination. 
Beyond these particular approaches, several broader points 
also deserve emphasis. To begin, there is the critical impor-
tance of consistency. This is true of command-and-control regu-
lation as well.310 But, in a regulatory regime directed to the 
shaping of expectations, it is especially crucial. The U.S. re-
sponse to the financial crisis may be a mistake to learn from in 
this regard. Much of the market’s failure to respond to the gov-
ernment’s various initiatives through 2008 and 2009 might be 
blamed on the inconsistency of those policies. The purchase of 
banks’ toxic assets, the lending of significant funds to financial 
institutions, the extension of credit to hedge funds and private 
equity firms, and even the threat of nationalization might each 
have effectively loosened the credit markets, had any of these 
options been pursued consistently. Without that consistency, on 
the other hand, they were doomed to fail. Why? Because the 
shaping of expectations is, by very definition, an exercise in 
consistent and accurate prediction.311 
Further dimensions of the coordination function of regula-
tion in financial crises turn on the aforementioned role of gov-
ernment as market participant and on the role of relevant pri-
vate behavior.312 As to each, there is no dimension of coercion. 
Yet each may have a substantial role to play in shaping rele-
vant expectations. 
Recall the basic notion that government purchasing deci-
sions may impact expectations of the potential for a given 
standard, technology, or network to succeed. This is just the no-
 
 310. By comparison, inconsistent prosecution of legal or regulatory viola-
tions may be effective if coupled with some indeterminacy as to the occasions 
for prosecution and sufficiently severe penalties, when it occurs. 
 311. One might criticize Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s initial 
presentation of the Obama Administration’s financial market rescue plan along 
analogous grounds for its vague and undefined terms. See Deborah Solomon, 
Market Pans Bank Rescue Plan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2009, at A1, available at 
1995 WLNR 3801017. In the shaping of expectations, again, certainty and 
predictability may be especially essential. 
 312. I have already emphasized the potential role of private actors in facili-
tating coordination. See supra notes 206–08 and accompanying text. 
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tion at work in the government’s investment in firms from In-
dyMac Bank and General Motors to Citibank and AIG. Where 
the emphasis is on shaping the expectations of market partici-
pants, however, we might favor investment and payout struc-
tures that suggest relatively stronger expectations of reim-
bursement and even positive returns.313 Going a step further, 
hard bargaining by the U.S. Treasury in the negotiation of such 
bailout deals might offer a relatively more effective signal by 
more closely mimicking the behavior of the private investors 
whose expectations such public investment must ultimately 
change. 
As to private actors, an expectation-oriented coordination 
account holds similarly notable implications. Notwithstanding 
the diminished need for coercion in shaping expectations, it 
may have a place where the lending or investment practices of 
a particular firm (e.g., Goldman Sachs) has special salience in 
the market. Firms with particular potential to impact market 
expectations might be seen as plausible candidates for targeted 
coercive interventions of one sort or another. Coerced or other-
wise incentivized lending or investing by such firms might thus 
play a salutary role—not as an end unto itself, but to prompt 
lending and investment by others. One might imagine, from 
this vantage, the subsidization of a salient firm’s unilateral 
shift to a practice of lending or investment. Even at substantial 
cost, such a shift might serve a focal point function in facilitat-
ing a broader (if not especially rational) shift in expectations to 
renewed lending and investment. 
In fostering coordination amidst financial crises, a further 
point to recall is the central role of information. Each of the 
lines of action suggested above incorporates at least some di-
mension of information generation and distribution. This raises 
an interesting question, though, as to the appropriate approach 
to information dissemination amidst coordination-driven finan-
cial crises. If the operative goal is to shift expectations toward 
the preferred lend/invest equilibrium, one might plausibly ar-
gue for a strategy of selective information dissemination, in 
which the government only exposes positive information to the 
 
 313. Consider the case of the 1994 bailout of the Mexican peso, on which 
the United States turned a profit. See Anthony DePalma, Mexican Rescue 
Plan: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at A1. One might see the gov-
ernment’s relatively quick resale of IndyMac Bank, subsequent to its takeover, 
in a similar light. See Equity Partnership is Formed to Buy Remnants of In-
dyMac Bank for $13.9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2009, at B3. 
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light of day. As suggested by the role of official statements and 
the collection and distribution of market data, there is surely 
some wisdom in this approach. Yet, it is important to recognize 
its limits. The role of subprime securities in the recent financial 
crisis highlights as much. 
At least in some part, one can trace the contraction of the 
credit markets in 2008 and 2009 to the diminished value of 
these toxic assets following the collapse of the U.S. housing 
market. Given the limited volume of such securities as a pro-
portion of the total assets of the largest financial institutions, 
on the other hand, this explanation cannot suffice. Much of the 
shift in expectations thus lay in uncertainty as to the extent of 
exposure of any given financial institution to these invest-
ments. Dating back to the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 
2008, it was the unknown scope of liability, as much as any-
thing else, that prevented the effective pricing of assets and in-
stitutions and thereby precipitated the credit crunch. 
Whether rosy or gloomy, therefore, information may be 
critical to the alleviation of financial crises. Whether an asset 
or institution is worth pennies or its weight in gold, it can be 
effectively bought or sold when its worth is known. Only when 
its value is unknown ought we to expect investors to rationally 
sit it out. 
In handling the toxic assets generated by the housing mar-
ket’s collapse, therefore, the generation and dissemination of 
accurate information might have been even more important 
than removal of relevant securities from financial institutions’ 
books.314 Welcome as the latter might have been to those insti-
tutions, it was relatively less crucial to alleviating the financial 
crisis. Facilitation of necessary forensic accounting might have 
been a more useful first step. Government-sponsored auctions 
may likewise have served a role in helping the market generate 
accurate price information on distressed assets.315 Whatever 
the precise mechanism, even the generation of adverse infor-
mation may be important to the salutary shaping of expecta-
tions amidst financial crises. 
 
 314. Cf. Campbell R. Harvey, The Financial Crisis of 2008: What Needs to 
Happen After TARP 2–9 (Oct. 5, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1274327. 
 315. Cf. Edmund L. Andrews, Bank Crisis Deepens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 
2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 1150590 (explaining the difficulties 
faced by the Obama Administration in planning the recovery from the finan-
cial crisis). 
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That said, the role of cold, hard information in shaping ex-
pectations should not be overstated. Important dimensions of 
expectation formation are non-rational in nature and have little 
to do with information as such.316 Perhaps especially with re-
gard to the financial markets, where Keynes spoke of the power 
of “animal spirits,”317 a coordination-oriented regulatory regime 
does well to acknowledge the place of irrationality. Here, it is 
especially difficult to offer a coherent account of possible ele-
ments of a relevant regulatory scheme. The lesson of coordina-
tion, in fact, may lie in just the opposite notion. An effective 
regulatory approach to financial crises must recognize the po-
tential for non-rational factors to play a significant role, and be 
willing to take advantage of such factors where possible. 
Whether it is the adjustment in expectations prompted by a 
dominant market participant’s decision to lend or invest, the 
potential for a similar response to the decision of a competitor 
to do so, or broader tendencies toward herd behavior, non-
rationality may be an important element in coordination-driven 
responses to financial crises. 
Finally, by way of this thumbnail sketch of a coordination-
driven regulatory approach to financial crises, we should recall 
the need for regulators to attend closely to group dynamics. 
Most tangibly, one might see this in the aforementioned role of 
gatherings of relevant market participants in shaping coordi-
nated expectations. A group conception of the regulatory project 
amidst financial crises likewise underlies the possibility of tar-
geted incentives—whether carrot or stick—to encourage lend-
ing or investment by salient market participants. In such cases, 
individual behavior is not an end unto itself. It becomes simply 
a means to the ends of an adjustment in group expectations. 
  CONCLUSION   
Nearly a half-century ago amidst dramatic changes in the 
nature of the regulatory state and its place in the social and 
economic order, Charles Reich highlighted the emergence of a 
“New Property.”318 Decades later, changes in our social and 
economic life counsel recognition of a New Regulation as well. 
Dynamics of coordination stand at the heart of life in the mod-
ern industrialized state. In the financial markets, the operation 
 
 316. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 317. See KEYNES, supra note 38, at 161–62. 
 318. See Reich, supra note 180, at 787. 
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of the Internet, standard-setting processes, the building of tele-
communications, transportation, and social networks, and the 
encouragement of innovation, effective coordination is among 
our most critical challenges. Given the increasing significance 
of so many of these areas, moreover, we can only expect the im-
portance of coordination to grow in the years ahead. 
It is essential, then, that our theories of regulation keep 
up. The lack of emphasis on coordination in our standard ac-
counts of the role and function of the regulatory state is no 
longer sustainable. To the contrary, we need an affirmative 
theory of the role of regulation in a coordination economy. This 
need not be seen as displacing the need to address our tradi-
tional fears of individual or institutional defection. Even the 
fundamentally coordination-driven financial crisis was charac-
terized by significant incidents of defection-style market fail-
ure—from the high-risk investments of AIG to the massive 
fraud perpetrated by Bernie Madoff. Coordination must simply 
be added alongside defection as a source of concern for the reg-
ulatory state. 
Whatever the extent and nature of a regulatory regime at-
tuned to coordination, what is minimally clear is that it de-
serves our closer attention. Coordination stands at the heart of 
many of the most important—and most chaotic—areas of mod-
ern regulation. If our regulatory approach to these modern 
challenges is to succeed, the study of coordination must move to 
the center of regulation theory. 
